Chapter 6

The Cultural Reconfiguration of Global Politics

Groping for Groupings: The Politics of Identity

Spurred by modernization, global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines. Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together. Peoples and countries with different cultures are coming apart.

Alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilization. Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilizational. Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics.

During the Cold War a country could be nonaligned, as many were, or it could, as some did, change its alignment from one side to another. The leaders of a country could make these choices in terms of their perceptions of their security interests, their calculations of the balance of power, and their ideological preferences. In the new world, however, cultural identity is the central factor shaping a country’s associations and antagonisms. While a country could avoid Cold War alignment, it cannot lack an identity. The question, “Which side are you on?” has been replaced by the much more fundamental one, “Who are you?” Every state has to have an answer. That answer, its cultural identity, defines the state’s place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies.

The 1990s have seen the eruption of a global identity crisis. Almost everywhere one looks, people have been asking, “Who are we?” “Where do we belong?” and “Who is not us?” These questions are central not only to peoples attempting to forge new nation states, as in the former Yugoslavia, but also
much more generally. In the mid-1990s the countries where questions of national identity were actively debated included, among others: Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. Identity issues are, of course, particularly intense in cleft countries that have sizable groups of people from different civilizations.

In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones. In Europe, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, culturally part of the West, had to be divorced from the West and neutral during the Cold War; they are now able to join their cultural kin in the European Union. The Catholic and Protestant countries in the former Warsaw Pact, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, are moving toward membership in the Union and in NATO, and the Baltic states are in line behind them. The European powers make it clear that they do not want a Muslim state, Turkey, in the European Union and are not happy about having a second Muslim state, Bosnia, on the European continent. In the north, the end of the Soviet Union stimulates the emergence of new (and old) patterns of association among the Baltic republics and between them, Sweden, and Finland. Sweden’s prime minister pointedly reminds Russia that the Baltic republics are part of Sweden’s “near abroad” and that Sweden could not be neutral in the event of Russian aggression against them.

Similar realignments occur in the Balkans. During the Cold War, Greece and Turkey were in NATO, Bulgaria and Romania were in the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia was nonaligned, and Albania was an isolated sometime associate of communist China. Now these Cold War alignments are giving way to civilizational ones rooted in Islam and Orthodoxy. Balkan leaders talk of crystallizing a Greek-Serb-Bulgarian Orthodox alliance. The “Balkan wars,” Greece’s prime minister alleges, “... have brought to the surface the resonance of Orthodoxies... this is a bond. It was dormant, but with the developments in the Balkans, it is taking on some real substance. In a very fluid world, people are seeking identity and security. People are looking for roots and connections to defend themselves against the unknown.” These views were echoed by the leader of the principal opposition party in Serbia: “The situation in southeastern Europe will soon require the formation of a new Balkan alliance of Orthodox countries, including Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, in order to resist the encroachment of Islam.” Looking northward, Orthodox Serbia and Romania cooperate closely in dealing with their common problems with Catholic Hungary. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the “unnatural” alliance between Greece and Turkey becomes essentially meaningless, as conflicts intensify between them over the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, their military balance, their roles in NATO and the European Union, and their relations with the United States. Turkey reasserts its role as the protector of Balkan Muslims and provides
support to Bosnia. In the former Yugoslavia, Russia backs Orthodox Serbia, Germany promotes Catholic Croatia, Muslim countries rally to the support of the Bosnian government, and the Serbs fight Croatsians, Bosnian Muslims, and Albanian Muslims. Overall, the Balkans have once again been Balkanized along the religious lines. “Two axes are emerging,” as Misha Glenny observed, “one dressed in the garb of Eastern Orthodoxy, one veiled in Islamic raiment” and the possibility exists of “an ever-greater struggle for influence between the Belgrade/Athens axis and the Albanian/Turkish alliance.”

Meanwhile in the former Soviet Union, Orthodox Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine gravitate toward Russia, and Armenians and Azeris fight each other while their Russian and Turkish kin attempt both to support them and to contain the conflict. The Russian army fights Muslim fundamentalists in Tajikistan and Muslim nationalists in Chechnya. The Muslim former Soviet republics work to develop various forms of economic and political association among themselves and to expand their ties with their Muslim neighbors, while Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia devote great effort to cultivating relations with these new states. In the Subcontinent, India and Pakistan remain at loggerheads over Kashmir and the military balance between them, fighting in Kashmir intensifies, and within India, new conflicts arise between Muslim and Hindu fundamentalists.

In East Asia, home to people of six different civilizations, arms builds up gain momentum and territorial disputes come to the fore. The three lesser Chinas, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia become increasingly oriented toward, involved in, and dependent on the mainland. The two Koreas move hesitatingly but meaningfully toward unification. The relations in Southeast Asian states between Muslims, on the one hand, and Chinese and Christians, on the other, become increasingly tense and at times violent.

In Latin America, economic associations—Mercosur, the Andean Pact, the tripartite pact (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela), the Central American Common Market—take on a new life, reaffirming the point demonstrated most graphically by the European Union that economic integration proceeds faster and further when it is based on cultural commonality. At the same time, the United States and Canada attempt to absorb Mexico into the North American Free Trade Area in a process whose long-term success depends largely on the ability of Mexico to redefine itself culturally from Latin American to North American.

With the end of the Cold War order, countries throughout the world began developing new and reinvigorating old antagonisms and affiliations. They have been groping for groupings, and they are finding those groupings with countries of similar culture and the same civilization. Politicians invoke and publics identify with “greater” cultural communities that transcend nation state boundaries, including “Greater Serbia,” “Greater China,” “Greater Turkey,” “Greater
Hungary,” “Greater Croatia,” “Greater Azerbaijan,” “Greater Russia,” “Greater Albania,” “Greater Iran,” and “Greater Uzbekistan.”

Will political and economic alignments always coincide with those of culture and civilization? Of course not. Balance of power considerations will at times lead to cross-civilizational alliances, as they did when Francis I joined with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs. In addition, patterns of association formed to serve the purposes of states in one era will persist into a new era. They are, however, likely to become weaker and less meaningful and to be adapted to serve the purposes of the new age. Greece and Turkey will undoubtedly remain members of NATO but their ties to other NATO states are likely to attenuate. So also are the alliances of the United States with Japan and Korea, its de facto alliance with Israel, and its security ties with Pakistan. Multicivilizational international organizations like ASEAN could face increasing difficulty in maintaining their coherence. Countries such as India and Pakistan, partners of different superpowers during the Cold War, now redefine their interests and seek new associations reflecting the realities of cultural politics. African countries which were dependent on Western support designed to counter Soviet influence look increasingly to South Africa for leadership and succor.

Why should cultural commonality facilitate cooperation and cohesion among people and cultural differences promote cleavages and conflicts?

First, everyone has multiple identities which may compete with or reinforce each other: kinship, occupational, cultural, institutional, territorial, educational, partisan, ideological, and others. Identifications along one dimension may clash with those along a different dimension: in a classic case the German workers in 1914 had to choose between their class identification with the international proletariat and their national identification with the German people and empire. In the contemporary world, cultural identification is dramatically increasing in importance compared to other dimensions of identity.

Along any single dimension, identity is usually most meaningful at the immediate face-to-face level. Narrower identities, however, do not necessarily conflict with broader ones. A military officer can identify institutionally with his company, regiment, division, and service. Similarly, a person can identify culturally with his or her clan, ethnic group, nationality, religion, and civilization. The increased salience of cultural identity at lower levels may well reinforce its salience at higher levels. As Burke suggested: “The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. . . . To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections.” In a world where culture counts, the platoons are tribes and ethnic groups, the regiments are nations, and the armies are civilizations. The increased extent to which people throughout the world differentiate themselves along cultural lines means that conflicts between cultural groups are increasingly important; civilizations are the broadest cultural entities; hence conflicts between groups from different civilizations become central to global politics.
Second, the increased salience of cultural identity is in large part, as is argued in chapters 3 and 4, the result of social-economic modernization at the individual level, where dislocation and alienation create the need for more meaningful identities, and at the societal level, where the enhanced capabilities and power of non-Western societies stimulate the revitalization of indigenous identities and culture.

Third, identity at any level—personal, tribal, racial, civilizational—can only be defined in relation to an “other,” a different person, tribe, race, or civilization. Historically relations between states or other entities of the same civilization have differed from relations between states or entities of different civilizations. Separate codes governed behavior toward those who are “like us” and the “barbarians” who are not. The rules of the nations of Christendom for dealing with each other were different from those for dealing with the Turks and other “heathens.” Muslims acted differently toward those of Dar al-Islam and those of Dar al-harb. The Chinese treated Chinese foreigners and non-Chinese foreigners in separate ways. The civilizational “us” and the extracivilizational “them” is a constant in human history. These differences in intra- and extracivilizational behavior stem from:

1. feelings of superiority (and occasionally inferiority) toward people who are perceived as being very different;
2. fear of and lack of trust in such people;
3. difficulty of communication with them as a result of differences in language and what is considered civil behavior;
4. lack of familiarity with the assumptions, motivations, social relationships, and social practices of other people.

In today’s world, improvements in transportation and communication have produced more frequent, more intense, more symmetrical, and more inclusive interactions among people of different civilizations. As a result their civilizational identities become increasingly salient. The French, Germans, Belgians, and Dutch increasingly think of themselves as European. Middle East Muslims identify with and rally to the support of Bosnians and Chechens. Chinese throughout East Asia identify their interests with those of the mainland. Russians identify with and provide support to Serbs and other Orthodox peoples. These broader levels of civilizational identity mean deeper consciousness of civilizational differences and of the need to protect what distinguishes “us” from “them.”

Fourth, the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilizations are, in large measure, those which have always generated conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth, and resources, and relative power, that is the ability to impose one’s own values, culture, and institutions on another group as compared to that group’s ability to do that to you. Conflict between cultural groups, however, may also involve cultural issues. Differences
in secular ideology between Marxist-Leninism and liberal democracy can at
least be debated if not resolved. Differences in material interest can be negoti-
ated and often settled by compromise in a way cultural issues cannot. Hindus
and Muslims are unlikely to resolve the issue of whether a temple or a mosque
should be built at Ayodhya by building both, or neither, or a syncretic building
that is both a mosque and a temple. Nor can what might seem to be a straight-
forward territorial question between Albanian Muslims and Orthodox Serbs
concerning Kosovo or between Jews and Arabs concerning Jerusalem be easily
settled, since each place has deep historical, cultural, and emotional meaning
to both peoples. Similarly, neither French authorities nor Muslim parents are
likely to accept a compromise which would allow schoolgirls to wear Muslim
dress every other day during the school year. Cultural questions like these
involve a yes or no, zero-sum choice.

Fifth and finally is the ubiquity of conflict. It is human to hate. For self-
definition and motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals
in achievement, opponents in politics. They naturally distrust and see as threats
those who are different and have the capability to harm them. The resolution
of one conflict and the disappearance of one enemy generate personal, social,
and political forces that give rise to new ones. “The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ tendency
is,” as Ali Mazrui said, “in the political arena, almost universal.” In the contem-
porary world the “them” is more and more likely to be people from a different
civilization. The end of the Cold War has not ended conflict but has rather
given rise to new identities rooted in culture and to new patterns of conflict
among groups from different cultures which at the broadest level are civiliza-
tions. Simultaneously, common culture also encourages cooperation among
states and groups which share that culture, which can be seen in the emerging
patterns of regional association among countries, particularly in the economic
area.

Culture and Economic Cooperation
The early 1990s heard much talk of regionalism and the regionalization of
world politics. Regional conflicts replaced the global conflict on the world’s
security agenda. Major powers, such as Russia, China, and the United States,
as well as secondary powers, such as Sweden and Turkey, redefined their
security interests in explicitly regional terms. Trade within regions expanded
faster than trade between regions, and many foresaw the emergence of regional
economic blocs, European, North American, East Asian, and perhaps others.

The term “regionalism,” however, does not adequately describe what was
happening. Regions are geographical not political or cultural entities. As with
the Balkans or the Middle East, they may be riven by inter- and intracivilization
conflicts. Regions are a basis for cooperation among states only to the extent
that geography coincides with culture. Divorced from culture, propinquity does
not yield commonality and may foster just the reverse. Military alliances and economic associations require cooperation among their members, cooperation depends on trust, and trust most easily springs from common values and culture. As a result, while age and purpose also play a role, the overall effectiveness of regional organizations generally varies inversely with the civilization diversity of their membership. By and large, single civilization organizations do more things and are more successful than multcivilizational organizations. This is true of both political and security organizations, on the one hand, and economic organizations, on the other.

The success of NATO has resulted in large part from its being the central security organization of Western countries with common values and philosophical assumptions. The Western European Union is the product of a common European culture. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the other hand, includes countries from at least three civilizations with quite different values and interests which pose major obstacles to its developing a significant institutional identity and a wide range of important activities. The single civilization Caribbean Community (CARICOM), composed of thirteen English-speaking former British colonies, has created an extensive variety of cooperative arrangements, with more intensive cooperation among some subgroupings. Efforts to create broader Caribbean organizations bridging the Anglo-Hispanic fault line in the Caribbean have, however, consistently failed. Similarly, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, formed in 1985 and including seven Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist states has been almost totally ineffectual, even to the point of not being able to hold meetings.¹

The relation of culture to regionalism is clearly evident with respect to economic integration. From least to most integrated, the four recognized levels of economic association among countries are:

1. free trade area;
2. customs union;
3. common market;
4. economic union.

The European Union has moved furthest down the integration road with a common market and many elements of an economic union. The relatively homogeneous Mercosur and the Andean Pact countries in 1994 were in the process of establishing customs unions. In Asia the multivilizational ASEAN only in 1992 began to move toward development of a free trade area. Other multivilizational economic organizations lagged even further behind. In 1995, with the marginal exception of NAFTA, no such organization had created a free trade area much less any more extensive form of economic integration.

In Western Europe and Latin America civilizational commonality fosters
cooperation and regional organization. Western Europeans and Latin Americans know they have much in common. Five civilizations (six if Russia is included) exist in East Asia. East Asia, consequently, is the test case for developing meaningful organizations not rooted in common civilization. As of the early 1990s no security organization or multilateral military alliance, comparable to NATO, existed in East Asia. One multivilizational regional organization, ASEAN, had been created in 1967 with one Sinic, one Buddhist, one Christian, and two Muslim member states, all of which confronted active challenges from communist insurgencies and potential ones from North Vietnam and China.

ASEAN is often cited as an example of an effective multicultural organization. It is, however, an example of the limits of such organizations. It is not a military alliance. While its members at times cooperate militarily on a bilateral basis, they are also all expanding their military budgets and engaged in military buildups, in striking contrast to the reductions West European and Latin American countries are making. On the economic front, ASEAN was from the beginning designed to achieve “economic cooperation rather than economic integration,” and as a result regionalism has developed at a “modest pace,” and even a free trade area is not contemplated until the twenty-first century. In 1978 ASEAN created the Post Ministerial Conference in which its foreign ministers could meet with those from its “dialogue partners”: the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the European Community. The PMC, however, has been primarily a forum for bilateral conversations and has been unable to deal with “any significant security issues.” In 1993 ASEAN spawned a still larger arena, the ASEAN Regional Forum, which included its members and dialogue partners, plus Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. As its name implies, however, this organization was a place for collective talk not collective action. Members used its first meeting in July 1994 to “air their views on regional security issues,” but controversial issues were avoided because, as one official commented, if they were raised, “the participants concerned would begin attacking each other.”

Meaningful East Asian regional organizations will emerge only if there is sufficient East Asian cultural commonality to sustain them. East Asian societies undoubtedly share some things in common which differentiate them from the West. Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir Mohammad, argues that these commonalities provide a basis for association and has promoted formation of the East Asian Economic Caucus on these grounds. It would include the ASEAN countries, Myanmar, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and, most important, China and Japan. Mahathir argues that the EAEC is rooted in a common culture. It should be thought of “not just as a geographical group, because it is in East Asia, but also as a cultural group. Although East Asians
may be Japanese or Koreans or Indonesians, culturally they have certain similarities. . . . Europeans flock together and Americans flock together. We Asians should flock together as well." Its purpose, as one of his associates said, is to enhance "regional trade among countries with commonalities here in Asia."7

The underlying premise of the EAEC is thus that economics follows culture. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are excluded from it because culturally they are not Asian. The success of the EAEC, however, depends overwhelmingly on participation by Japan and China. Mahathir has pleaded with the Japanese to join. "Japan is Asian. Japan is of East Asia," he told a Japanese audience. "You cannot turn from this geo-cultural fact. You belong here."8 The Japanese government, however, was reluctant to enlist in the EAEC, in part for fear of offending the United States and in part because it was divided over whether it should identify itself with Asia. If Japan joins the EAEC, it would dominate it, which is likely to cause fear and uncertainty among the members as well as intense antagonism on the part of China. For several years there was much talk of Japan creating an Asian "yen bloc" to balance the European Union and the NAFTA. Japan, however, is a lone country with few cultural connections with its neighbors and as of 1995 no yen bloc had materialized.

While ASEAN moved slowly, the yen bloc remained a dream, Japan wavered, and the EAEC did not get off the ground, economic interaction in East Asia nonetheless increased dramatically. This expansion was rooted in the cultural ties among East Asian Chinese communities. These ties gave rise to "continuing informal integration" of a Chinese-based international economy, comparable in many respects to the Hanseatic League, and "perhaps leading to a de facto Chinese common market"9 (see pp. 168–74). In East Asia, as elsewhere, cultural commonality has been the prerequisite to meaningful economic integration.

The end of the Cold War stimulated efforts to create new and to revive old regional economic organizations. The success of these efforts has depended overwhelmingly on the cultural homogeneity of the states involved. Shimon Peres' 1994 plan for a Middle East common market is likely to remain a "desert mirage" for some while to come: "The Arab world," one Arab official commented, "is not in need of an institution or a development bank in which Israel participates."10 The Association of Caribbean States, created in 1994 to link CARICOM to Haiti and the Spanish-speaking countries of the region, shows little signs of overcoming the linguistic and cultural differences of its diverse membership and the insularity of the former British colonies and their overwhelming orientation toward the United States.11 Efforts involving more culturally homogeneous organizations, on the other hand, were making progress. Although divided along subcivilizational lines, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1985 revived the moribund Regional Cooperation for Development which they had established in 1977, renaming it the Economic Cooperation Organi-
organization. Agreements were subsequently reached on tariff reductions and a variety of other measures, and in 1992 ECO membership was expanded to include Afghanistan and the six Muslim former Soviet republics. Meanwhile, the five Central Asian former Soviet republics in 1991 agreed in principle to create a common market, and in 1994 the two largest states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to allow the "free circulation of goods, services and capital" and to coordinate their fiscal, monetary, and tariff policies. In 1991 Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay joined together in Mercosur with the goal of leapfrogging the normal stages of economic integration, and by 1995 a partial customs union was in place. In 1990 the previously stagnant Central American Common Market established a free trade area, and in 1994 the formerly equally passive Andean Group created a customs union. In 1992 the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) agreed to establish a Central European Free Trade Area and in 1994 speeded up the timetable for its realization.12

Trade expansion follows economic integration, and during the 1980s and early 1990s intraregional trade became increasingly more important relative to interregional trade. Trade within the European Community constituted 50.6 percent of the community's total trade in 1980 and grew to 58.9 percent by 1989. Similar shifts toward regional trade occurred in North America and East Asia. In Latin America, the creation of Mercosur and the revival of the Andean Pact stimulated an upsurge in intra-Latin American trade in the early 1990s, with trade between Brazil and Argentina tripling and Colombia-Venezuela trade quadrupling between 1990 and 1993. In 1994 Brazil replaced the United States as Argentina's principal trading partner. The creation of NAFTA was similarly accompanied by a significant increase in Mexican-U.S. trade. Trade within East Asia also expanded more rapidly than extraregional trade, but its expansion was hampered by Japan's tendency to keep its markets closed. Trade among the countries of the Chinese cultural zone (ASEAN, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and China), on the other hand, increased from less than 20 percent of their total in 1970 to almost 30 percent of their total in 1992, while Japan's share of their trade declined from 23 percent to 13 percent. In 1992 Chinese zone exports to other zone countries exceeded both their exports to the United States and their combined exports to Japan and the European Community.13

As a society and civilization unique to itself, Japan faces difficulties developing its economic ties with East Asia and dealing with its economic differences with the United States and Europe. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may forge with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences from those countries, and particularly from their largely Chinese economic elites, preclude it from creating a Japanese-led regional economic grouping comparable to NAFTA or the European Union. At the same time, its cultural differences with the West exacerbate misunderstanding and antagonism in its
economic relations with the United States and Europe. If, as seems to be the case, economic integration depends on cultural commonality, Japan as a culturally lone country could have an economically lonely future.

In the past the patterns of trade among nations have followed and paralleled the patterns of alliance among nations.\textsuperscript{14} In the emerging world, patterns of trade will be decisively influenced by the patterns of culture. Businessmen make deals with people they can understand and trust; states surrender sovereignty to international associations composed of like-minded states they understand and trust. The roots of economic cooperation are in cultural commonality.

\textbf{The Structure of Civilizations}

In the Cold War, countries related to the two superpowers as allies, satellites, clients, neutrals, and nonaligned. In the post–Cold War world, countries relate to civilizations as member states, core states, lone countries, cleft countries, and torn countries. Like tribes and nations, civilizations have political structures. A \textit{member state} is a country fully identified culturally with one civilization, as Egypt is with Arab-Islamic civilization and Italy is with European-Western civilization. A civilization may also include people who share in and identify with its culture, but who live in states dominated by members of another civilization. Civilizations usually have one or more places viewed by their members as the principal source or sources of the civilization’s culture. These sources are often located within the \textit{core state} or states of the civilization, that is, its most powerful and culturally central state or states.

The number and role of core states vary from civilization to civilization and may change over time. Japanese civilization is virtually identical with the single Japanese core state. Sinic, Orthodox, and Hindu civilizations each have one overwhelmingly dominant core state, other member states, and people affiliated with their civilization in states dominated by people of a different civilization (overseas Chinese, “near abroad” Russians, Sri Lankan Tamils). Historically the West has usually had several core states; it has now two cores, the United States and a Franco-German core in Europe, with Britain an additional center of power adrift between them. Islam, Latin America, and Africa lack core states. This is in part due to the imperialism of the Western powers, which divided among themselves Africa, the Middle East, and in earlier centuries and less decisively, Latin America.

The absence of an Islamic core state poses major problems for both Muslim and non-Muslim societies, which are discussed in chapter 7. With respect to Latin America, conceivably Spain could have become the core state of a Spanish-speaking or even Iberian civilization but its leaders consciously chose to become a member state in European civilization, while at the same time maintaining cultural links with its former colonies. Size, resources, population,
military and economic capacity, qualify Brazil to be the leader of Latin America, and conceivably it could become that. Brazil, however, is to Latin America what Iran is to Islam. Otherwise well-qualified to be a core state, subcivilizational differences (religious with Iran, linguistic with Brazil) make it difficult for it to assume that role. Latin America thus has several states, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina, which cooperate in and compete for leadership. The Latin American situation is also complicated by the fact that Mexico has attempted to redefine itself from a Latin American to a North American identity and Chile and other states may follow. In the end, Latin American civilization could merge into and become one subvariant of a three-pronged Western civilization.

The ability of any potential core state to provide leadership to sub-Saharan Africa is limited by its division into French-speaking and English-speaking countries. For a while Côte d’Ivoire was the core state of French-speaking Africa. In considerable measure, however, the core state of French Africa has been France, which after independence maintained intimate economic, military, and political connections with its former colonies. The two African countries that are most qualified to become core states are both English-speaking. Size, resources, and location make Nigeria a potential core state, but its intercivilizational disunity, massive corruption, political instability, repressive government, and economic problems have severely limited its ability to perform this role, although it has done so on occasion. South Africa’s peaceful and negotiated transition from apartheid, its industrial strength, its higher level of economic development compared to other African countries, its military capability, its natural resources, and its sophisticated black and white political leadership all mark South Africa as clearly the leader of southern Africa, probably the leader of English Africa, and possibly the leader of all sub-Saharan Africa.

A lone country lacks cultural commonality with other societies. Ethiopia, for example, is culturally isolated by its predominant language, Amharic, written in the Ethiopic script; its predominant religion, Coptic Orthodoxy; its imperial history; and its religious differentiation from the largely Muslim surrounding peoples. While Haiti’s elite has traditionally relished its cultural ties to France, Haiti’s Creole language, Voodoo religion, revolutionary slave origins, and brutal history combine to make it a lone country. “Every nation is unique,” Sidney Mintz observed, but “Haiti is in a class by itself.” As a result, during the Haitian crisis of 1994, Latin American countries did not view Haiti as a Latin American problem and were unwilling to accept Haitian refugees although they took in Cuban ones. “[I]n Latin America,” as Panama’s president-elect put it, “Haiti is not recognized as a Latin American country. Haitians speak a different language. They have different ethnic roots, a different culture. They are very different altogether.” Haiti is equally separate from the English-speaking black countries of the Caribbean. Haitians, one commentator observed, are “just as
strange to someone from Grenada or Jamaica as they would be to someone from Iowa or Montana.” Haiti, “the neighbor nobody wants,” is truly a kinless country.¹⁵

The most important lone country is Japan. No other country shares its distinct culture, and Japanese migrants are either not numerically significant in other countries or have assimilated to the cultures of those countries (e.g., Japanese-Americans). Japan’s loneliness is further enhanced by the fact that its culture is highly particularistic and does not involve a potentially universal religion (Christianity, Islam) or ideology (liberalism, communism) that could be exported to other societies and thus establish a cultural connection with people in those societies.

Almost all countries are heterogeneous in that they include two or more ethnic, racial, and religious groups. Many countries are divided in that the differences and conflicts among these groups play an important role in the politics of the country. The depth of this division usually varies over time. Deep divisions within a country can lead to massive violence or threaten the country’s existence. This latter threat and movements for autonomy or separation are most likely to arise when cultural differences coincide with differences in geographic location. If culture and geography do not coincide, they may be made to coincide through either genocide or forced migration.

Countries with distinct cultural groupings belonging to the same civilization may become deeply divided with separation either occurring (Czechoslovakia) or becoming a possibility (Canada). Deep divisions are, however, much more likely to emerge within a cleft country where large groups belong to different civilizations. Such divisions and the tensions that go with them often develop when a majority group belonging to one civilization attempts to define the state as its political instrument and to make its language, religion, and symbols those of the state, as Hindus, Sinhalese, and Muslims have attempted to do in India, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia.

Cleft countries that territorially straddle the fault lines between civilizations face particular problems maintaining their unity. In Sudan, civil war has gone on for decades between the Muslim north and the largely Christian south. The same civilizational division has bedeviled Nigerian politics for a similar length of time and stimulated one major war of secession plus coups, rioting, and other violence. In Tanzania, the Christian animist mainland and Arab Muslim Zanzibar have drifted apart and in many respects become two separate countries, with Zanzibar in 1992 secretly joining the Organization of the Islamic Conference and then being induced by Tanzania to withdraw from it the following year.¹⁶ The same Christian-Muslim division has generated tensions and conflicts in Kenya. On the horn of Africa, largely Christian Ethiopia and overwhelmingly Muslim Eritrea separated from each other in 1993. Ethiopia was left, however, with a substantial Muslim minority among its Oromo people. Other countries divided by civilizational fault lines include: India (Muslims
and Hindus), Sri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus), Malaysia and Singapore (Chinese and Malay Muslims), China (Han Chinese, Tibetan Buddhists, Turkic Muslims), Philippines (Christians and Muslims), and Indonesia (Muslims and Timorese Christians).

The divisive effect of civilizational fault lines has been most notable in those cleft countries held together during the Cold War by authoritarian communist regimes legitimated by Marxist-Leninist ideology. With the collapse of communism, culture replaced ideology as the magnet of attraction and repulsion, and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union came apart and divided into new entities grouped along civilizational lines: Baltic (Protestant and Catholic), Orthodox, and Muslim republics in the former Soviet Union; Catholic Slovenia and Croatia; partially Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Orthodox Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia in the former Yugoslavia. Where these successor entities still encompassed multiculturizations, second-stage divisions manifested themselves. Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided by war into Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian sections, and Serbs and Croats fought each other in Croatia. The sustained peaceful position of Albanian Muslim Kosovo within Slavic Orthodox Serbia is highly uncertain, and tensions rose between the Albanian Muslim minority and the Slavic Orthodox majority in Macedonia. Many former Soviet republics also bestride civilizational fault lines, in part because the Soviet government shaped boundaries so as to create divided republics, Russian Crimea going to Ukraine, Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Russia has several, relatively small, Muslim minorities, most notably in the North Caucasus and the Volga region. Estonia, Latvia, and Kazakhstan have substantial Russian minorities, also produced in considerable measure by Soviet policy. Ukraine is divided between the Uniate nationalist Ukrainian-speaking west and the Orthodox Russian-speaking east.

In a cleft country major groups from two or more civilizations say, in effect, “We are different peoples and belong in different places.” The forces of repulsion drive them apart and they gravitate toward civilizational magnets in other societies. A torn country, in contrast, has a single predominant culture which places it in one civilization but its leaders want to shift it to another civilization. They say, in effect, “We are one people and belong together in one place but we want to change that place.” Unlike the people of cleft countries, the people of torn countries agree on who they are but disagree on which civilization is properly their civilization. Typically, a significant portion of the leaders embrace a Kemalist strategy and decide their society should reject its non-Western culture and institutions, should join the West, and should both modernize and Westernize. Russia has been a torn country since Peter the Great, divided over the issue of whether it is part of Western civilization or is the core of a distinct Eurasian Orthodox civilization. Mustafa Kemal’s country is, of course, the classic torn country which since the 1920s has been trying to modernize, to Westernize, and to become part of the West. After almost two centuries of
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Mexico defining itself as a Latin American country in opposition to the United States, its leaders in the 1980s made their country a torn country by attempting to redefine it as a North American society. Australia’s leaders in the 1990s, in contrast, are trying to delink their country from the West and make it a part of Asia, thereby creating a torn-country-in-reverse. Torn countries are identifiable by two phenomena. Their leaders refer to them as a “bridge” between two cultures, and observers describe them as Janus-faced. “Russia looks West—and East”; “Turkey: East, West, which is best?”; “Australian nationalism: Divided loyalties”; are typical headlines highlighting torn country identity problems.17

Torn Countries: The Failure of Civilization Shifting

For a torn country successfully to redefine its civilizational identity, at least three requirements must be met. First, the political and economic elite of the country has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, the public has to be at least willing to acquiesce in the redefinition of identity. Third, the dominant elements in the host civilization, in most cases the West, have to be willing to embrace the convert. The process of identity redefinition will be prolonged, interrupted, and painful, politically, socially, institutionally, and culturally. It also to date has failed.

Russia. In the 1990s Mexico had been a torn country for several years and Turkey for several decades. Russia, in contrast, has been a torn country for several centuries, and unlike Mexico or republican Turkey, it is also the core state of a major civilization. If Turkey or Mexico successfully redefined themselves as members of Western civilization, the effect on Islamic or Latin American civilization would be minor or moderate. If Russia became Western, Orthodox civilization ceases to exist. The collapse of the Soviet Union rekindled among Russians debate on the central issue of Russia and the West.

Russia’s relations with Western civilization have evolved through four phases. In the first phase, which lasted down to the reign of Peter the Great (1689–1725), Kievan Rus and Muscovy existed separately from the West and had little contact with Western European societies. Russian civilization developed as an offspring of Byzantine civilization and then for two hundred years, from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fifteenth centuries, Russia was under Mongol suzerainty. Russia had no or little exposure to the defining historical phenomena of Western civilization: Roman Catholicism, feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, overseas expansion and colonization, the Enlightenment, and the emergence of the nation state. Seven of the eight previously identified distinctive features of Western civilization—religion, languages, separation of church and state, rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, individualism—were almost totally absent from the Russian experience. The only possible exception is the Classical legacy, which, however, came to Russia via Byzan-
tium and hence was quite different from that which came to the West directly from Rome. Russian civilization was a product of its indigenous roots in Kievan Rus and Moscovy, substantial Byzantine impact, and prolonged Mongol rule. These influences shaped a society and a culture which had little resemblance to those developed in Western Europe under the influence of very different forces.

At the end of the seventeenth century Russia was not only different from Europe, it was also backward compared to Europe, as Peter the Great learned during his European tour in 1697–1698. He became determined both to modernize and to Westernize his country. To make his people look European, the first thing Peter did on returning to Moscow was to shave the beards of his nobles and ban their long gowns and conical hats. Although Peter did not abolish the Cyrillic alphabet he did reform and simplify it and introduce Western words and phrases. He gave top priority, however, to the development and modernization of Russia’s military forces: creating a navy, introducing conscription, building defense industries, establishing technical schools, sending people to the West to study, and importing from the West the latest knowledge concerning weapons, ships and shipbuilding, navigation, bureaucratic administration, and other subjects essential to military effectiveness. To provide for these innovations, he drastically reformed and expanded the tax system and also, toward the end of his reign, reorganized the structure of government. Determined to make Russia not only a European power but also a power in Europe, he abandoned Moscow, created a new capital at St. Petersburg, and launched the Great Northern War against Sweden in order to establish Russia as the predominant force in the Baltic and to create a presence in Europe.

In attempting to make his country modern and Western, however, Peter also reinforced Russia’s Asiatic characteristics by perfecting despotism and eliminating any potential source of social or political pluralism. Russian nobility had never been powerful. Peter reduced them still further, expanding the service nobility, and establishing a Table of Ranks based on merit, not birth or social position. Noblemen like peasants were conscripted into the service of the state, forming the “cringing aristocracy” that later infuriated Cusine.18 The autonomy of the serfs was further restricted as they were bound more firmly to both their land and their master. The Orthodox Church, which had always been under broad state control, was reorganized and placed under a synod directly appointed by the tsar. The tsar was also given power to appoint his successor without reference to the prevailing practices of inheritance. With these changes, Peter initiated and exemplified the close connection in Russia between modernization and Westernization, on the one hand, and despotism, on the other. Following this Petrine model, Lenin, Stalin, and to a lesser degree Catherine II and Alexander II, also tried in varying ways to modernize and Westernize Russia and strengthen autocratic power. At least until the 1980s, the democratizers in Russia were usually Westernizers, but the Westernizers
were not democratizers. The lesson of Russian history is that the centralization of power is the prerequisite to social and economic reform. In the late 1980s associates of Gorbachev lamented their failure to appreciate this fact in decrying the obstacles which glasnost had created for economic liberalization.

Peter was more successful making Russia part of Europe than making Europe part of Russia. In contrast to the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire came to be accepted as a major and legitimate participant in the European international system. At home Peter’s reforms brought some changes but his society remained hybrid: apart from a small elite, Asiatic and Byzantine ways, institutions, and beliefs predominated in Russian society and were perceived to do so by both Europeans and Russians. “Scratch a Russian,” de Maistre observed, “and you wound a Tatar.” Peter created a torn country, and during the nineteenth century Slavophiles and Westernizers jointly lamented this unhappy state and vigorously disagreed on whether to end it by becoming thoroughly Europeanized or by eliminating European influences and returning to the true soul of Russia. A Westernizer like Chaadayev argued that the “sun is the sun of the West” and Russia must use this light to illuminate and to change its inherited institutions. A Slavophile like Danilevskiy, in words that were also heard in the 1990s, denounced Europeanizing efforts as “distorting the people’s life and replacing its forms with alien, foreign forms,” “borrowing foreign institutions and transplanting them to Russian soil,” and “regarding both domestic and foreign relations and questions of Russian life from a foreign, European viewpoint, viewing them, as it were, through a glass fashioned to a European angle of refraction.”19 In subsequent Russian history Peter became the hero of Westernizers and the satan of their opponents, represented at the extreme by the Eurasians of the 1920s who denounced him as a traitor and hailed the Bolsheviks for rejecting Westernization, challenging Europe, and moving the capital back to Moscow.

The Bolshevik Revolution initiated a third phase in the relationship between Russia and the West very different from the ambivalent one that had existed for two centuries. It created a political-economic system which could not exist in the West in the name of an ideology which was created in the West. The Slavophiles and Westernizers had debated whether Russia could be different from the West without being backward compared to the West. Communism brilliantly resolved this issue: Russia was different from and fundamentally opposed to the West because it was more advanced than the West. It was taking the lead in the proletarian revolution which would eventually sweep across the world. Russia embodied not a backward Asiatic past but a progressive Soviet future. In effect, the Revolution enabled Russia to leapfrog the West, differentiating itself not because “you are different and we won’t become like you,” as the Slavophiles had argued, but because “we are different and eventually you will become like us,” as was the message of the Communist International.

Yet at the same time that communism enabled Soviet leaders to distinguish
themselves from the West, it also created powerful ties to the West. Marx and Engels were German; most of the principal exponents of their views in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were Western European; by 1910 many labor unions and social democratic and labor parties in Western societies were committed to their ideology and were becoming increasingly influential in European politics. After the Bolshevik Revolution, left-wing parties split into communist and socialist parties, and both were often powerful forces in European countries. Throughout much of the West, the Marxist perspective prevailed: communism and socialism were seen as the wave of the future and were widely embraced in one way or another by political and intellectual elites. The debate in Russia between Slavophiles and Westernizers over the future of Russia was thus replaced by a debate in Europe between left and right over the future of the West and whether or not the Soviet Union epitomized that future. After World War II the power of the Soviet Union reinforced the appeal of communism both in the West and, more significantly, in those non-Western civilizations which were now reacting against the West. Elites in Western-dominated non-Western societies who wished to seduce the West talked in terms of self-determination and democracy; those who wished to confront the West invoked revolution and national liberation.

By adopting Western ideology and using it to challenge the West, Russians in a sense became closer to and more intimately involved with the West than at any previous time in their history. Although the ideologies of liberal democracy and communism differed greatly, both parties were, in a sense, speaking the same language. The collapse of communism and of the Soviet Union ended this political-ideological interaction between the West and Russia. The West hoped and believed the result would be the triumph of liberal democracy throughout the former Soviet empire. That, however, was not foreordained. As of 1995 the future of liberal democracy in Russia and the other Orthodox republics was uncertain. In addition, as the Russians stopped behaving like Marxists and began behaving like Russians, the gap between Russia and the West broadened. The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, were both modern and secular and ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality, and material well-being. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be impossible for him to do that with a Russian Orthodox nationalist.

During the Soviet years the struggle between Slavophiles and Westernizers was suspended as both Solzhenitsyns and Sakharovs challenged the communist synthesis. With the collapse of that synthesis, the debate over Russia’s true identity reemerged in full vigor. Should Russia adopt Western values, institutions, and practices, and attempt to become part of the West? Or did Russia embody a distinct Orthodox and Eurasian civilization, different from the West’s with a unique destiny to link Europe and Asia? Intellectual and political elites
and the general public were seriously divided over these questions. On the one hand were the Westernizers, “cosmopolitans,” or “Atlanticists,” and on the other, the successors to the Slavophiles, variously referred to as “nationalists,” “Eurasianists,” or “derzhavniki” (strong state supporters).20

The principal differences between these groups were over foreign policy and to a lesser degree economic reform and state structure. Opinions were distributed over a continuum from one extreme to another. Grouped toward one end of the spectrum were those who articulated “the new thinking” espoused by Gorbachev and epitomized in his goal of a “common European home” and many of Yeltsin’s top advisors, expressed in his desire that Russia become “a normal country” and be accepted as the eighth member of the G-7 club of major industrialized democracies. The more moderate nationalists such as Sergei Stankevich argued that Russia should reject the “Atlanticist” course and should give priority to the protection of Russians in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote “an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, or the eastern direction.”21 People of this persuasion criticized Yeltsin for subordinating Russia’s interests to those of the West, for reducing Russian military strength, for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian people. Indicative of this trend was the new popularity of the ideas of Peter Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian civilization.

The more extreme nationalists were divided between Russian nationalists, such as Solzhenitsyn, who advocated a Russia including all Russians plus closely linked Slavic Orthodox Byelorussians and Ukrainians but no one else, and the imperial nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who wanted to recreate the Soviet empire and Russian military strength. People in the latter group at times were anti-Semtic as well as anti-Western and wanted to reorient Russian foreign policy to the East and South, either dominating the Muslim South (as Zhirinovsky urged) or cooperating with Muslim states and China against the West. The nationalists also backed more extensive support for the Serbs in their war with the Muslims. The differences between cosmopolitans and nationalists were reflected institutionally in the outlooks of the Foreign Ministry and the military. They were also reflected in the shifts in Yeltsin’s foreign and security policies first in one direction and then in the other.

The Russian public was as divided as the Russian elites. A 1992 poll of a sample of 2069 European Russians found that 40 percent of the respondents were “open to the West,” 36 percent “closed to the West,” and 24 percent “undecided.” In the December 1993 parliamentary elections reformist parties won 34.2 percent of the vote, antireform and nationalist parties 43.3 percent, and centrist parties 13.7 percent.22 Similarly, in the June 1996 presidential election, the Russian public divided again with roughly 43 percent supporting the West’s candidate, Yeltsin, and other reform candidates and 52 percent
voting for nationalist and communist candidates. On the central issue of its identity, Russia in the 1990s clearly remained a torn country, with the Western-Slavophile duality “an inalienable trait of the . . . national character.”

Turkey. Through a carefully calculated series of reforms in the 1920s and 1930s Mustafa Kemal Ataturk attempted to move his people away from their Ottoman and Muslim past. The basic principles or “six arrows” of Kemalism were populism, republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism. Rejecting the idea of a multinational empire, Kemal aimed to produce a homogeneous nation state, expelling and killing Armenians and Greeks in the process. He then deposed the sultan and established a Western type republican system of political authority. He abolished the caliphate, the central source of religious authority, ended the traditional education and religious ministries, abolished the separate religious schools and colleges, established a unified secular system of public education, and did away with the religious courts that applied Islamic law, replacing them with a new legal system based on the Swiss civil code. He also replaced the traditional calendar with the Gregorian calendar and formally disestablished Islam as the state religion. Emulating Peter the Great, he prohibited use of the fez because it was a symbol of religious traditionalism, encouraged people to wear hats, and decreed that Turkish would be written in Roman rather than Arabic script. This latter reform was of fundamental importance. “It made it virtually impossible for the new generations educated in the Roman script to acquire access to the vast bulk of traditional literature; it encouraged the learning of European languages; and it greatly eased the problem of increasing literacy.” Having redefined the national, political, religious, and cultural identity of the Turkish people, Kemal in the 1930s vigorously attempted to promote Turkish economic development. Westernization went hand-in-hand with and was to be the means of modernization.

Turkey remained neutral during the West’s civil war between 1939 and 1945. Following that war, however, it quickly moved to identify itself still further with the West. Explicitly following Western models, it shifted from one-party rule to a competitive party system. It lobbied for and eventually achieved NATO membership in 1952, thus confirming itself as a member of the Free World. It became the recipient of billions of dollars of Western economic and security assistance; its military forces were trained and equipped by the West and integrated into the NATO command structure; it hosted American military bases. Turkey came to be viewed by the West as its eastern bulwark of containment, preventing the expansion of the Soviet Union toward the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. This linkage with and self-identification with the West caused the Turks to be denounced by the non-Western, non-aligned countries at the 1955 Bandung Conference and to be attacked as blasphemous by Islamic countries.
After the Cold War the Turkish elite remained overwhelmingly supportive of Turkey being Western and European. Sustained NATO membership is for them indispensable because it provides an intimate organizational tie with the West and is necessary to balance Greece. Turkey's involvement with the West, embodied in its NATO membership, was, however, a product of the Cold War. Its end removes the principal reason for that involvement and leads to a weakening and redefinition of that connection. Turkey is no longer useful to the West as a bulwark against the major threat from the north, but rather, as in the Gulf War, a possible partner in dealing with lesser threats from the south. In that war Turkey provided crucial help to the anti-Saddam Hussein coalition by shutting down the pipeline across its territory through which Iraqi oil reached the Mediterranean and by permitting American planes to operate against Iraq from bases in Turkey. These decisions by President Öal, however, stimulated substantial criticism in Turkey and prompted the resignation of the foreign minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff, as well as large public demonstrations protesting Öal's close cooperation with the United States. Subsequently both President Demirel and Prime Minister Ciller urged early ending of U.N. sanctions against Iraq, which also imposed considerable economic burden on Turkey. Turkey's willingness to work with the West in dealing with Islamic threats from the south is more uncertain than was its willingness to stand with the West against the Soviet threat. During the Gulf crisis, opposition by Germany, a traditional friend of Turkey's, to viewing an Iraqi missile attack on Turkey as an attack on NATO also showed that Turkey could not count on Western support against southern threats. Cold War confrontations with the Soviet Union did not raise the question of Turkey's civilization identity; post-Cold War relations with Arab countries do.

Beginning in the 1980s a primary, perhaps the primary, foreign policy goal of Turkey's Western-oriented elite has been to secure membership in the European Union. Turkey formally applied for membership in April 1987. In December 1989 Turkey was told that its application could not be considered before 1993. In 1994 the Union approved the applications of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, and it was widely anticipated that in the coming years favorable action would be taken on those of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and later possibly on Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Baltic republics. The Turks were particularly disappointed that again Germany, the most influential member of the European Community, did not actively support their membership and instead gave priority to promoting membership for the Central European states. Pressured by the United States, the Union did negotiate a customs union with Turkey; full membership, however, remains a distant and dubious possibility.

Why was Turkey passed over and why does it always seem to be at the end of the queue? In public, European officials referred to Turkey's low level of economic development and its less than Scandinavian respect for human
rights. In private, both Europeans and Turks agreed that the real reasons were the intense opposition of the Greeks and, more importantly, the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country. European countries did not want to face the possibility of opening their borders to immigration from a country of 60 million Muslims and much unemployment. Even more significantly, they felt that culturally the Turks did not belong in Europe. Turkey’s human rights record, as President Özal said in 1992, is a “made-up reason why Turkey should not join the EC. The real reason is that we are Muslim, and they are Christian,” but he added, “they don’t say that.” European officials, in turn, agreed that the Union is “a Christian club” and that “Turkey is too poor, too populous, too Muslim, too harsh, too culturally different, too everything.” The “private nightmare” of Europeans, one observer commented, is the historical memory of “Saracen raiders in Western Europe and the Turks at the gates of Vienna.” These attitudes, in turn, generated the “common perception among Turks” that “the West sees no place for a Muslim Turkey within Europe.”

Having rejected Mecca, and being rejected by Brussels, Turkey seized the opportunity opened by the dissolution of the Soviet Union to turn toward Tashkent. President Özal and other Turkish leaders held out the vision of a community of Turkic peoples and made great efforts to develop links with the “external Turks” in Turkey’s “near abroad” stretching “from the Adriatic to the borders of China.” Particular attention was directed to Azerbaijan and the four Turkic-speaking Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In 1991 and 1992 Turkey launched a wide range of activities designed to bolster its ties with and its influence in these new republics. These included $1.5 billion in long-term low-interest loans, $79 million in direct relief aid, satellite television (replacing a Russian language channel), telephone communications, airline service, thousands of scholarships for students to study in Turkey, and training in Turkey for Central Asian and Azeri bankers, businesspersons, diplomats, and hundreds of military officers. Teachers were sent to the new republics to teach Turkish, and about 2000 joint ventures were started. Cultural commonality smoothed these economic relationships. As one Turkish businessman commented, “The most important thing for success in Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan is finding the right partner. For Turkish people, it is not so difficult. We have the same culture, more or less the same language, and we eat from the same kitchen.”

Turkey’s reorientation toward the Caucasus and Central Asia was fueled not only by the dream of being the leader of a Turkic community of nations but also by the desire to counter Iran and Saudi Arabia from expanding their influence and promoting Islamic fundamentalism in this region. The Turks saw themselves as offering the “Turkish model” or the “idea of Turkey”—a secular, democratic Muslim state with a market economy—as an alternative. In addition, Turkey hoped to contain the resurgence of Russian influence. By providing an alternative to Russia and Islam, Turkey also would bolster its claim for support from and eventual membership in the European Union.
Turkey’s initial surge of activity with the Turkic republics became more restrained in 1993 due to the limits on its resources, the succession of Süleyman Demirel to the presidency following Özal’s death, and the realignment of Russia’s influence in what it considered its “near abroad.” When the Turkic former Soviet republics first became independent, their leaders rushed to Ankara to court Turkey. Subsequently, as Russia applied pressure and inducements, they swung back and generally stressed the need for “balanced” relationships between their cultural cousin and their former imperial master. The Turks, however, continued to attempt to use their cultural affiliations to expand their economic and political linkages and, in their most important coup, secured agreement of the relevant governments and oil companies to the construction of a pipeline to bring Central Asian and Azerbaijani oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean.

While Turkey worked to develop its links with the Turkic former Soviet republics, its own Kemalist secular identity was under challenge at home. First, for Turkey, as for so many other counties, the end of the Cold War, together with the dislocations generated by social and economic development, raised major issues of “national identity and ethnic identification,” and religion was there to provide an answer. The secular heritage of Atatürk and of the Turkish elite for two-thirds of a century came increasingly under fire. The experience of Turks abroad tended to stimulate Islamist sentiments at home. Turks coming back from West Germany “reacted to hostility there by falling back on what was familiar. And that was Islam.” Mainstream opinion and practice became increasingly Islamist. In 1993 it was reported “that Islamic-style beards and veiled women have proliferated in Turkey, that mosques are drawing even larger crowds, and that some bookstores are overflowing with books and journals, cassettes, compact disks and videos glorifying Islamic history, precepts and way of life and exalting the Ottoman Empire’s role in preserving the values of the Prophet Muhammad.” Reportedly, “no fewer than 290 publishing houses and printing presses, 300 publications including four dailies, some hundred unlicensed radio stations and about 30 likewise unlicensed television channels were all propagating Islamic ideology.”

Confronted by rising Islamist sentiment, Turkey’s rulers attempted to adopt fundamentalist practices and co-opt fundamentalist support. In the 1980s and 1990s the supposedly secular Turkish government maintained an Office of Religious Affairs with a budget larger than those of some ministries, financed the construction of mosques, required religious instruction in all public schools, and provided funding to Islamic schools, which quintupled in number during the 1980s, enrolling about 15 percent of secondary school children, and which preached Islamist doctrines and produced thousands of graduates, many of whom entered government service. In symbolic but dramatic contrast to France, the government in practice allowed schoolgirls to wear the traditional Muslim headscarf, seventy years after Atatürk banned the fez. These government actions, in large part motivated by the desire to take the wind out of the
sails of the Islamists, testify to how strong that wind was in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Second, the resurgence of Islam changed the character of Turkish politics. Political leaders, most notably Turgut Özal, quite explicitly identified themselves with Muslim symbols and policies. In Turkey, as elsewhere, democracy reinforced indigenization and the return to religion. "In their eagerness to curry favor with the public and gain votes, politicians—and even the military, the very bastion and guardian of secularism—had to take into account the religious aspirations of the population: not a few of the concessions they granted smacked of demagoguery." Popular movements were religiously inclined. While elite and bureaucratic groups, particularly the military, were secularly oriented, Islamist sentiments manifested themselves within the armed forces, and several hundred cadets were purged from military academies in 1987 because of suspected Islamist sentiments. The major political parties increasingly felt the need to seek electoral support from revived Muslim tarikas, or select societies, which Atatürk had banned. In the March 1994 local elections, the fundamentalist Welfare Party, alone among the five major parties, increased its share of the vote, receiving roughly 19 percent of the votes as compared with 21 percent for Prime Minister Ciller’s True Path Party and 20 percent for the late Özal’s Motherland Party. The Welfare Party captured control of Turkey’s two principal cities, Istanbul and Ankara, and ran extremely strong in the southeastern part of the country. In the December 1995 elections the Welfare Party won more votes and seats in parliament than any other party and six months later took over the government in coalition with one of the secular parties. As in other countries, support for the fundamentalists came from the young, returned migrants, the “downtrodden and dispossessed,” and “new urban migrants, the ‘sans culottes’ of the big cities.”

Third, the resurgence of Islam affected Turkish foreign policy. Under President Özal’s leadership, Turkey decisively sided with the West in the Gulf War, anticipating that this action would further its membership in the European Community. This consequence did not, however, materialize, and NATO hesitation over what response it would make if Turkey had been attacked by Iraq during that war did not reassure the Turks as to how NATO would respond to a non-Russian threat to their country. Turkish leaders tried to expand their military connection with Israel, which provoked intense criticism from Turkish Islamists. More significantly, during the 1980s Turkey expanded its relations with Arab and other Muslim countries and in the 1990s actively promoted Islamic interests by providing significant support to the Bosnian Muslims as well as to Azerbaijan. With respect to the Balkans, Central Asia, or the Middle East, Turkish foreign policy was becoming increasingly Islamicized.

For many years Turkey met two of the three minimum requirements for a torn country to shift its civilizational identity. Turkey’s elites overwhelmingly supported the move and its public was acquiescent. The elites of the recipient,
Western civilization, however, were not receptive. While the issue hung in the balance, the resurgence of Islam within Turkey activated anti-Western sentiments among the public and began to undermine the secularist, pro-Western orientation of Turkish elites. The obstacles to Turkey’s becoming fully European, the limits on its ability to play a dominant role with respect to the Turkic former Soviet republics, and the rise of Islamic tendencies eroding the Ataturk inheritance, all seemed to insure that Turkey will remain a torn country.

Reflecting these conflicting pulls, Turkish leaders regularly described their country as a “bridge” between cultures. Turkey, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller argued in 1993, is both a “Western democracy” and “part of the Middle East” and “bridges two civilizations, physically and philosophically.” Reflecting this ambivalence, in public in her own country Ciller often appeared as a Muslim, but when addressing NATO she argued that “the geographic and political fact is that Turkey is a European country.” President Suleyman Demirel similarly called Turkey “a very significant bridge in a region extending from west to east, that is from Europe to China.” A bridge, however, is an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey’s leaders term their country a bridge, they euphemistically confirm that it is torn.

Mexico. Turkey became a torn country in the 1920s, Mexico not until the 1980s. Yet their historical relations with the West have certain similarities. Like Turkey, Mexico had a distinctly non-Western culture. Even in the twentieth century, as Octavio Paz put it, “the core of Mexico is Indian. It is non-European.” In the nineteenth century, Mexico, like the Ottoman empire, was dismembered by Western hands. In the second and third decades of the twentieth century, Mexico, like Turkey, went through a revolution which established a new basis of national identity and a new one-party political system. In Turkey, however, the revolution involved both a rejection of traditional Islamic and Ottoman culture and an effort to import Western culture and to join the West. In Mexico, as in Russia, the revolution involved incorporation and adaptation of elements of Western culture, which generated a new nationalism opposed to the capitalism and democracy of the West. Thus for sixty years Turkey tried to define itself as European, while Mexico tried to define itself in opposition to the United States. From the 1930s to the 1980s, Mexico’s leaders pursued economic and foreign policies that challenged American interests.

In the 1980s this changed. President Miguel de la Madrid began and his successor President Carlos Salinas de Gortari carried forward a full-scale re-definition of Mexican purposes, practices, and identity, the most sweeping effort at change since the Revolution of 1910. Salinas became, in effect, the Mustafa Kemal of Mexico. Ataturk promoted secularism and nationalism, dominant themes in the West of his time; Salinas promoted economic liberalism, one of two dominant themes in the West of his time (the other, political democracy, he did not embrace). As with Ataturk, these views were broadly
shared by political and economic elites, many of whom, like Salinas and de la Madrid, had been educated in the United States. Salinas dramatically reduced inflation, privatized large numbers of public enterprises, promoted foreign investment, reduced tariffs and subsidies, restructured the foreign debt, challenged the power of labor unions, increased productivity, and brought Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada. Just as Ataturk’s reforms were designed to transform Turkey from a Muslim Middle Eastern country into a secular European country, Salina’s reforms were designed to change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country.

This was not an inevitable choice for Mexico. Conceivably Mexican elites could have continued to pursue the anti-U.S. Third World nationalist and protectionist path that their predecessors had followed for most of the century. Alternatively, as some Mexicans urged, they could have attempted to develop with Spain, Portugal, and South American countries an Iberian association of nations.

Will Mexico succeed in its North American quest? The overwhelming bulk of the political, economic, and intellectual elites favor that course. Also, unlike the situation with Turkey, the overwhelming bulk of the political, economic, and intellectual elites of the recipient civilization have favored Mexico’s cultural realignment. The crucial intercivilizational issue of immigration highlights this difference. The fear of massive Turkish immigration generated resistance from both European elites and publics to bringing Turkey into Europe. In contrast, the fact of massive Mexican immigration, legal and illegal, into the United States was part of Salinas’s argument for NAFTA: “Either you accept our goods or you accept our people.” In addition, the cultural distance between Mexico and the United States is far less than that between Turkey and Europe. Mexico’s religion is Catholicism, its language is Spanish, its elites were oriented historically to Europe (where they sent their children to be educated) and more recently to the United States (where they now send their children). The accommodation between Anglo-American North America and Spanish-Indian Mexico should be considerably easier than that between Christian Europe and Muslim Turkey. Despite these commonalities, after ratification of NAFTA, opposition to any closer involvement with Mexico developed in the United States with demands for restrictions on immigration, complaints about factories moving south, and questions about the ability of Mexico to adhere to North American concepts of liberty and the rule of law.39

The third prerequisite to the successful shift of identity by a torn country is general acquiescence, although not necessarily support, by its public. The importance of this factor depends, in some measure, on how important the views of the public are in the decision-making processes of the country. Mexico’s pro-Western stance was, as of 1995, untested by democratization. The New Year’s Day revolt of a few thousand well-organized and externally supported
guerrillas in Chiapas was not, in itself, an indication of substantial resistance to North Americanization. The sympathetic response it engendered, however, among Mexican intellectuals, journalists, and other shapers of public opinion suggested that North Americanization in general and NAFTA in particular could encounter increasing resistance from Mexican elites and the public. President Salinas very consciously gave economic reform and Westernization priority over political reform and democratization. Both economic development and the increasing involvement with the United States, however, will strengthen forces promoting a real democratization of the Mexican political system. The key question for the future of Mexico is: To what extent will modernization and democratization stimulate de-Westernization, producing its withdrawal from or the drastic weakening of NAFTA and parallel changes in the policies imposed on Mexico by its Western-oriented elites of the 1980s and 1990s? Is Mexico’s North Americanization compatible with its democratization?

Australia. In contrast to Russia, Turkey, and Mexico, Australia has, from its origins, been a Western society. Throughout the twentieth century it was closely allied with first Britain and then the United States; and during the Cold War it was not only a member of the West but also of the U.S.-U.K.-Canadian-Australian military and intelligence core of the West. In the early 1990s, however, Australia’s political leaders decided, in effect, that Australia should defect from the West, redefine itself as an Asian society, and cultivate close ties with its geographical neighbors. Australia, Prime Minister Paul Keating declared, must cease being a “branch office of empire,” become a republic, and aim for “enmeshment” in Asia. This was necessary, he argued, in order to establish Australia’s identity as an independent country. “Australia cannot represent itself to the world as a multicultural society, engage in Asia, make that link and make it persuasively while in some way, at least in constitutional terms, remaining a derivative society.” Australia, Keating declared, had suffered untold years of “anglophilia and torpor” and continued association with Britain would be “debilitating to our national culture, our economic future and our destiny in Asia and the Pacific.” Foreign Minister Gareth Evans expressed similar sentiments.50

The case for redefining Australia as an Asian country was grounded on the assumption that economics overrides culture in shaping the destiny of nations. The central impetus was the dynamic growth of East Asian economies, which in turn spurred the rapid expansion of Australian trade with Asia. In 1971 East and Southeast Asia absorbed 39 percent of Australia’s exports and provided 21 percent of Australia’s imports. By 1994 East and Southeast Asia were taking 62 percent of Australia’s exports and providing 41 percent of its imports. In contrast, in 1991 11.8 percent of Australian exports went to the European Community and 10.1 percent to the United States. This deepening economic tie with
Asia was reinforced in Australian minds by a belief that the world was moving in the direction of three major economic blocs and that Australia’s place was in the East Asian bloc.

Despite these economic connections, the Australian Asian ploy appears unlikely to meet any of the requirements for success for a civilization shift by a torn country. First, in the mid-1990s Australian elites were far from overwhelmingly enthusiastic about this course. In some measure, this was a partisan issue with leaders of the Liberal Party ambivalent or opposed. The Labor government also came under substantial criticism from a variety of intellectuals and journalists. No clear elite consensus existed for the Asian choice. Second, public opinion was ambivalent. From 1987 to 1993, the proportion of the Australian public favoring the end of the monarchy rose from 21 percent to 46 percent. At that point, however, support began to waver and to erode. The proportion of the public supporting deletion of the Union Jack from the Australian flag dropped from 42 percent in May of 1992 to 35 percent in August 1993. As one Australian official observed in 1992, “It’s hard for the public to stomach it. When I say periodically that Australia should be part of Asia, I can’t tell you how many hate letters I get.”

Third and most important, the elites of Asian countries have been even less receptive to Australia’s advances than European elites have been to Turkey’s. They have made it clear that if Australia wants to be part of Asia it must become truly Asian, which they think unlikely if not impossible. “The success of Australia’s integration with Asia,” one Indonesian official said, “depends on one thing — how far Asian states welcome the Australian intention. Australia’s acceptance in Asia depends on how well the government and people of Australia understand Asian culture and society.” Asians see a gap between Australia’s Asian rhetoric and its perversely Western reality. The Thais, according to one Australian diplomat, treat Australia’s insistence it is Asian with “bemused tolerance.”

“[C]ulturally Australia is still European,” Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia declared in October 1994, “...we think it’s European,” and hence Australia should not be a member of the East Asian Economic Caucus. We Asians “are less prone to making outright criticism of other countries or passing judgment on them. But Australia, being European culturally, feels that it has a right to tell others what to do, what not to do, what is right, what is wrong. And then, of course, it is not compatible with the group. That is my reason [for opposing their membership in EAEC]. It is not the color of the skin, but the culture.”

As Mahathir stated, culture and values are the basic obstacle to Australia’s joining Asia. Clashes regularly occur over the Australians’ commitment to
democracy, human rights, a free press, and its protests over the violations of those rights by the governments of virtually all its neighbors. "The real problem for Australia in the region," a senior Australian diplomat noted, "is not our flag, but the root social values. I suspect you won't find any Australians who are willing to surrender any of those values to be accepted in the region." Differences in character, style, and behavior are also pronounced. As Mahathir suggested, Asians generally pursue their goals with others in ways which are subtle, indirect, modulated, devious, nonjudgmental, nonmoralistic, and non-confrontational. Australians, in contrast, are the most direct, blunt, outspoken, some would say insensitive, people in the English-speaking world. This clash of cultures was most dramatically evident in Paul Keating's own dealings with Asians. Keating embodied Australian national characteristics to an extreme. He has been described as "a pile driver of a politician" with a style that is "inherently provocative and pugnacious," and he did not hesitate to denounce his political opponents as "scumbags," "perfumed gigolos," and "brain-damaged looney crims." While arguing that Australia must be Asian, Keating regularly irritated, shocked, and antagonized Asian leaders by his brutal frankness. The gap between cultures was so large that it blinded the proponent of cultural convergence to the extent his own behavior repelled those whom he claimed as cultural brethren.

The Keating-Evans choice could be viewed as the shortsighted result of overweighting economic factors and ignoring rather than renewing the country's culture, and as a tactical political ploy to distract attention from Australia's economic problems. Alternatively, it could be seen as a farsighted initiative designed to join Australia to and identify Australia with the rising centers of economic, political, and eventually military power in East Asia. In this respect, Australia could be the first of possibly many Western countries to attempt to defect from the West and bandwagon with rising non-Western civilizations. At the beginning of the twenty-second century, historians might look back on the Keating-Evans choice as a major marker in the decline of the West. If that choice is pursued, however, it will not eliminate Australia's Western heritage, and "the lucky country" will be a permanently torn country, both the "branch office of empire," which Paul Keating decried, and the "new white trash of Asia," which Lee Kuan Yew contemptuously termed it.

This was not and is not an unavoidable fate for Australia. Accepting their desire to break with Britain, instead of defining Australia as an Asian power, Australia's leaders could define it as a Pacific country, as, indeed, Keating's predecessor as prime minister, Robert Hawke, attempted to do. If Australia wishes to make itself a republic separated from the British crown, it could align itself with the first country in the world to do that, a country which like Australia is of British origin, is an immigrant country, is of continental size, speaks English, has been an ally in three wars, and has an overwhelmingly European, if also like Australia increasingly Asian, population. Culturally, the
values of the July 4th 1776 Declaration of Independence accord far more with Australian values than do those of any Asian country. Economically, instead of attempting to batter its way into a group of societies from which it is culturally alien and who for that reason reject it, Australia's leaders could propose expanding NAFTA into a North American–South Pacific (NASP) arrangement including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Such a grouping would reconcile culture and economics and provide a solid and enduring identity for Australia that will not come from futile efforts to make Australia Asian.

The Western Virus and Cultural Schizophrenia. While Australia's leaders embarked on a quest for Asia, those of other torn countries—Turkey, Mexico, Russia—attempted to incorporate the West into their societies and to incorporate their societies into the West. Their experience strongly demonstrates, however, the strength, resilience, and viscosity of indigenous cultures and their ability to renew themselves and to resist, contain, and adapt Western imports. While the rejectionist response to the West is impossible, the Kemalist response has been unsuccessful. If non-Western societies are to modernize, they must do it their own way not the Western way and, emulating Japan, build upon and employ their own traditions, institutions, and values.

Political leaders imbued with the hubris to think that they can fundamentally reshape the culture of their societies are destined to fail. While they can introduce elements of Western culture, they are unable permanently to suppress or to eliminate the core elements of their indigenous culture. Conversely, the Western virus, once it is lodged in another society, is difficult to expunge. The virus persists but is not fatal; the patient survives but is never whole. Political leaders can make history but they cannot escape history. They produce torn countries; they do not create Western societies. They infect their country with a cultural schizophrenia which becomes its continuing and defining characteristic.
Chapter 7

Core States, Concentric Circles, and Civilizational Order

Civilizations and Order

In the emerging global politics, the core states of the major civilizations are supplanting the two Cold War superpowers as the principal poles of attraction and repulsion for other countries. These changes are most clearly visible with respect to Western, Orthodox, and Sinic civilizations. In these cases civilizational groupings are emerging involving core states, member states, culturally similar minority populations in adjoining states, and, more controversially, peoples of other cultures in neighboring states. States in these civilizational blocs often tend to be distributed in concentric circles around the core state or states, reflecting their degree of identification with and integration into that bloc. Lacking a recognized core state, Islam is intensifying its common consciousness but so far has developed only a rudimentary common political structure.

Countries tend to bandwagon with countries of similar culture and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality. This is particularly true with respect to the core states. Their power attracts those who are culturally similar and repels those who are culturally different. For security reasons core states may attempt to incorporate or to dominate some peoples of other civilizations, who, in turn, attempt to resist or to escape such control (China vs. Tibetans and Uighurs; Russia vs. Tatars, Chechens, Central Asian Muslims). Historical relationships and balance of power considerations also lead some countries to resist the influence of their core state. Both Georgia and Russia are Orthodox countries, but the Georgians historically have resisted Russian domination and close association with Russia. Vietnam and China are
both Confucian countries, yet a comparable pattern of historical enmity has existed between them. Over time, however, cultural commonality and development of a broader and stronger civilizational consciousness could bring these countries together, as Western European countries have come together.

During the Cold War, what order there was was the product of superpower dominance of their two blocs and superpower influence in the Third World. In the emerging world, global power is obsolete, global community a distant dream. No country, including the United States, has significant global security interests. The components of order in today's more complex and heterogeneous world are found within and between civilizations. The world will be ordered on the basis of civilizations or not at all. In this world the core states of civilizations are sources of order within civilizations and, through negotiations with other core states, between civilizations.

A world in which core states play a leading or dominating role is a spheres-of-influence world. But it is also a world in which the exercise of influence by the core state is tempered and moderated by the common culture it shares with member states of its civilization. Cultural commonality legitimates the leadership and order-imposing role of the core state for both member states and for the external powers and institutions. It is thus futile to do as U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali did in 1994 and promulgate a rule of "sphere of influence keeping" that no more than one-third of the U.N. peacekeeping force should be provided by the dominant regional power. Such a requirement defies the geopolitical reality that in any given region where there is a dominant state peace can be achieved and maintained only through the leadership of that state. The United Nations is no alternative to regional power, and regional power becomes responsible and legitimate when exercised by core states in relation to other members of their civilization.

A core state can perform its ordering function because member states perceive it as cultural kin. A civilization is an extended family and, like older members of a family, core states provide their relatives with both support and discipline. In the absence of that kinship, the ability of a more powerful state to resolve conflicts in and impose order on its region is limited. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and even Sri Lanka will not accept India as the order provider in South Asia and no other East Asian state will accept Japan in that role in East Asia.

When civilizations lack core states the problems of creating order within civilizations or negotiating order between civilizations become more difficult. The absence of an Islamic core state which could legitimately and authoritatively relate to the Bosnians, as Russia did to the Serbs and Germany to the Croats, impelled the United States to attempt that role. Its ineffectiveness in doing so derived from the lack of American strategic interest in where state boundaries were drawn in the former Yugoslavia, the absence of any cultural connection between the United States and Bosnia, and European opposition
to the creation of a Muslim state in Europe. The absence of core states in both Africa and the Arab world has greatly complicated efforts to resolve the ongoing civil war in Sudan. Where core states exist, on the other hand, they are the central elements of the new international order based on civilizations.

**Bounding the West**

During the Cold War the United States was at the center of a large, diverse, multivilizational grouping of countries who shared the goal of preventing further expansion by the Soviet Union. This grouping, variously known as the “Free World,” the “West,” or the “Allies,” included many but not all Western societies, Turkey, Greece, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Israel, and, more loosely, other countries such as Taiwan, Thailand, and Pakistan. It was opposed by a grouping of countries only slightly less heterogeneous, which included all the Orthodox countries except Greece, several countries that were historically Western, Vietnam, Cuba, to a lesser degree India, and at times one or more African countries. With the end of the Cold War these multivilizational, cross-cultural groupings fragmented. The dissolution of the Soviet system, particularly the Warsaw Pact, was dramatic. More slowly but similarly the multivilizational “Free World” of the Cold War is being reconfigured into a new grouping more or less coextensive with Western civilization. A bounding process is underway involving the definition of the membership of Western international organizations.

The core states of the European Union, France and Germany, are circled first by an inner grouping of Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, all of which have agreed to eliminate all barriers to the transit of goods and persons; then other member countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Britain, Ireland, and Greece; states which became members in 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden); and those countries which as of that date were associate members (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania). Reflecting this reality, in the fall of 1994 both the governing party in Germany and top French officials advanced proposals for a differentiated Union. The German plan proposed that the “hard core” consist of the original members minus Italy and that “Germany and France form the core of the hard core.” The hard core countries would rapidly attempt to establish a monetary union and to integrate their foreign and defense policies. Almost simultaneously French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur suggested a three-tier Union with the five pro-integrationist states forming the core, the other current member states forming a second circle, and the new states on the way to becoming members constituting an outer circle. Subsequently French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé elaborated this concept proposing “an outer circle of ‘partner’ states, including Eastern and Central Europe; a middle circle of member states that would be required to accept common disciplines in certain fields (single
market, customs union, etc.); and several inner circles of ‘reinforced solidari-
ties’ incorporating those willing and able to move faster than others in such
areas as defense, monetary integration, foreign policy and so on.” Other politi-
cal leaders proposed other types of arrangements, all of which, however, in-
volved an inner grouping of more closely associated states and then outer
groupings of states less fully integrated with the core state until the line is
reached separating members from nonmembers.

Establishing that line in Europe has been one of the principal challenges
confronting the West in the post–Cold War world. During the Cold War
Europe as a whole did not exist. With the collapse of communism, however, it
became necessary to confront and answer the question: What is Europe? Eu-
rope’s boundaries on the north, west, and south are delimited by substantial
bodies of water, which to the south coincide with clear differences in culture.
But where is Europe’s eastern boundary? Who should be thought of as Euro-
pean and hence as potential members of the European Union, NATO, and
comparable organizations?

The most compelling and pervasive answer to these questions is provided by
the great historical line that has existed for centuries separating Western Chris-
tian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples. This line dates back to the
division of the Roman Empire in the fourth century and to the creation of the
Holy Roman Empire in the tenth century. It has been in roughly its current
place for at least five hundred years. Beginning in the north, it runs along what
are now the borders between Finland and Russia and the Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania) and Russia, through western Belarus, through Ukraine sepa-
rating the Uniate west from the Orthodox east, through Romania between
Transylvania with its Catholic Hungarian population and the rest of the coun-
try, and through the former Yugoslavia along the border separating Slovenia
and Croatia from the other republics. In the Balkans, of course, this line
coincides with the historical division between the Austro-Hungarian and Otto-
man empires. It is the cultural border of Europe, and in the post–Cold War
world it is also the political and economic border of Europe and the West.

The civilizational paradigm thus provides a clear-cut and compelling answer
to the question confronting West Europeans: Where does Europe end? Europe
ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin. This is
the answer which West Europeans want to hear, which they overwhelmingly
support sotto voce, and which various intellectuals and political leaders have
explicitly endorsed. It is necessary, as Michael Howard argued, to recognize
the distinction, blurred during the Soviet years, between Central Europe or
Mitteleuropa and Eastern Europe proper. Central Europe includes “those lands
which once formed part of Western Christendom; the old lands of the Haps-
burg Empire, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, together with Poland and
the eastern marches of Germany. The term ‘Eastern Europe’ should be re-
served for those regions which developed under the aegis of the Orthodox
Church: the Black Sea communities of Bulgaria and Romania which only emerged from Ottoman domination in the nineteenth century, and the ‘European’ parts of the Soviet Union.” Western Europe’s first task, he argued, must “be to reabsorb the peoples of Central Europe into our cultural and economic community where they properly belong: to reknit the ties between London, Paris, Rome, Munich, and Leipzig, Warsaw, Prague and Budapest.” A “new fault line” is emerging, Pierre Behar commented two years later, “a basically cultural divide between a Europe marked by western Christianity (Roman Catholic or Protestant), on the one hand, and a Europe marked by eastern Christianity and Islamic traditions, on the other.” A leading Finn similarly saw the crucial division in Europe replacing the Iron Curtain as “the ancient cultural fault line between East and West” which places “the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian empire as well as Poland and the Baltic states” within the Europe of the West and the other East European and Balkan countries outside it. This was, a prominent Englishman agreed, the “great religious divide . . . between the Eastern and Western churches: broadly speaking, between those peoples who received their Christianity from Rome directly or through Celtic or German intermediaries, and those in the East and Southeast to whom it came through Constantinople (Byzantium).”

People in Central Europe also emphasize the significance of this dividing line. The countries that have made significant progress in divesting themselves of the Communist legacies and moving toward democratic politics and market economies are separated from those which have not by “the line dividing Catholicism and Protestantism, on the one hand, from Orthodoxy, on the other.” Centuries ago, the president of Lithuania argued, Lithuanians had to choose between “two civilizations” and “opted for the Latin world, converted to Roman Catholicism and chose a form of state organization founded on law.” In similar terms, Poles say they have been part of the West since their choice in the tenth century of Latin Christianity against Byzantium. People from Eastern European Orthodox countries, in contrast, view with ambivalence the new emphasis on this cultural fault line. Bulgarians and Romanians see the great advantages of being part of the West and being incorporated into its institutions; but they also identify with their own Orthodox tradition and, on the part of the Bulgarians, their historically close association with Russia and Byzantium.

The identification of Europe with Western Christendom provides a clear criterion for the admission of new members to Western organizations. The European Union is the West’s primary entity in Europe and the expansion of its membership resumed in 1994 with the admission of culturally Western Austria, Finland, and Sweden. In the spring of 1994 the Union provisionally decided to exclude from membership all former Soviet republics except the Baltic states. It also signed “association agreements” with the four Central European states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) and two
Eastern European ones (Romania, Bulgaria). None of these states, however, is likely to become a full member of the EU until sometime in the twenty-first century, and the Central European states will undoubtedly achieve that status before Romania and Bulgaria, if, indeed, the latter ever do. Meanwhile eventual membership for the Baltic states and Slovenia looks promising, while the applications of Muslim Turkey, too-small Malta, and Orthodox Cyprus were still pending in 1995. In the expansion of EU membership, preference clearly goes to those states which are culturally Western and which also tend to be economically more developed. If this criterion were applied, the Visegrad states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), the Baltic republics, Slovenia, Croatia, and Malta would eventually become EU members and the Union would be coextensive with Western civilization as it has historically existed in Europe.

The logic of civilizations dictates a similar outcome concerning the expansion of NATO. The Cold War began with the extension of Soviet political and military control into Central Europe. The United States and Western European countries formed NATO to deter and, if necessary, defeat further Soviet aggression. In the post–Cold War world, NATO is the security organization of Western civilization. With the Cold War over, NATO has one central and compelling purpose: to insure that it remains over by preventing the reimposition of Russian political and military control in Central Europe. As the West’s security organization NATO is appropriately open to membership by Western countries which wish to join and which meet basic requirements in terms of military competence, political democracy, and civilian control of the military.

American policy toward post–Cold War European security arrangements initially embodied a more universalistic approach, embodied in the Partnership for Peace, which would be open generally to European and, indeed, Eurasian countries. This approach also emphasized the role of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was reflected in the remarks of President Clinton when he visited Europe in January 1994: “Freedom’s boundaries now should be defined by new behavior, not by old history. I say to all . . . who would draw a new line in Europe: we should not foreclose the possibility of the best future for Europe—democracy everywhere, market economies everywhere, countries cooperating for mutual security everywhere. We must guard against a lesser outcome.” A year later, however, the administration had come to recognize the significance of boundaries defined by “old history” and had come to accept a “lesser outcome” reflecting the realities of civilizational differences. The administration moved actively to develop the criteria and a schedule for the expansion of NATO membership, first to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, then to Slovenia, and later probably to the Baltic republics.

Russia vigorously opposed any NATO expansion, with those Russians who were presumably more liberal and pro-Western arguing that expansion would
greatly strengthen nationalist and anti-Western political forces in Russia. NATO expansion limited to countries historically part of Western Christendom, however, also guarantees to Russia that it would exclude Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine as long as Ukraine remained united. NATO expansion limited to Western states would also underline Russia's role as the core state of a separate, Orthodox civilization, and hence a country which should be responsible for order within and along the boundaries of Orthodoxy.

The usefulness of differentiating among countries in terms of civilization is manifest with respect to the Baltic republics. They are the only former Soviet republics which are clearly Western in terms of their history, culture, and religion, and their fate has consistently been a major concern of the West. The United States never formally recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union, supported their move to independence as the Soviet Union was collapsing, and insisted that the Russians adhere to the agreed-on schedule for the removal of their troops from the republics. The message to the Russians has been that they must recognize that the Baltics are outside whatever sphere of influence they may wish to establish with respect to other former Soviet republics. This achievement by the Clinton administration was, as Sweden's prime minister said, "one of its most important contributions to European security and stability" and helped Russian democrats by establishing that any revanchist designs by extreme Russian nationalists were futile in the face of the explicit Western commitment to the republics.

While much attention has been devoted to the expansion of the European Union and NATO, the cultural reconfiguration of these organizations also raises the issue of their possible contraction. One non-Western country, Greece, is a member of both organizations, and another, Turkey, is a member of NATO and an applicant for Union membership. These relationships were products of the Cold War. Do they have any place in the post-Cold War world of civilizations?

Turkey's full membership in the European Union is problematic and its membership in NATO has been attacked by the Welfare Party. Turkey is, however, likely to remain in NATO unless the Welfare Party scores a resounding electoral victory or Turkey otherwise consciously rejects its Ataturk heritage and redefines itself as a leader of Islam. This is conceivable and might be desirable for Turkey but also is unlikely in the near future. Whatever its role in NATO, Turkey will increasingly pursue its own distinctive interests with respect to the Balkans, the Arab world, and Central Asia.

Greece is not part of Western civilization, but it was the home of Classical civilization which was an important source of Western civilization. In their opposition to the Turks, Greeks historically have considered themselves spear-carriers of Christianity. Unlike Serbs, Romanians, or Bulgarians, their history has been intimately entwined with that of the West. Yet Greece is also an anomaly, the Orthodox outsider in Western organizations. It has never been an
easy member of either the EU or NATO and has had difficulty adapting itself to the principles and mores of both. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s it was ruled by a military junta, and could not join the European Community until it shifted to democracy. Its leaders often seemed to go out of their way to deviate from Western norms and to antagonize Western governments. It was poorer than other Community and NATO members and often pursued economic policies that seemed to flout the standards prevailing in Brussels. Its behavior as president of the EU’s Council in 1994 exasperated other members, and Western European officials privately label its membership a mistake.

In the post–Cold War world, Greece’s policies have increasingly deviated from those of the West. Its blockade of Macedonia was strenuously opposed by Western governments and resulted in the European Commission seeking an injunction against Greece in the European Court of Justice. With respect to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Greece separated itself from the policies pursued by the principal Western powers, actively supported the Serbs, and blatantly violated the U.N. sanctions levied against them. With the end of the Soviet Union and the communist threat, Greece has mutual interests with Russia in opposition to their common enemy, Turkey. It has permitted Russia to establish a significant presence in Greek Cyprus, and as a result of “their shared Eastern Orthodox religion,” the Greek Cypriots have welcomed both Russians and Serbs to the island. In 1995 some two thousand Russian-owned businesses were operating in Cyprus; Russian and Serbo-Croatian newspapers were published there; and the Greek Cypriot government was purchasing major supplies of arms from Russia. Greece also explored with Russia the possibility of bringing oil from the Caucasus and Central Asia to the Mediterranean through a Bulgarian-Greek pipeline bypassing Turkey and other Muslim countries. Overall Greek foreign policies have assumed a heavily Orthodox orientation. Greece will undoubtedly remain a formal member of NATO and the European Union. As the process of cultural reconfiguration intensifies, however, those memberships also undoubtedly will become more tenuous, less meaningful, and more difficult for the parties involved. The Cold War antagonist of the Soviet Union is evolving into the post–Cold War ally of Russia.

RUSSIA AND ITS NEAR ABROAD

The successor to the tsarist and communist empires is a civilizational bloc, paralleling in many respects that of the West in Europe. At the core, Russia, the equivalent of France and Germany, is closely linked to an inner circle including the two predominantly Slavic Orthodox republics of Belarus and Moldova, Kazakhstan, Armenia, 40 percent of whose population is Russian, and historically a close ally of Russia. In the mid-1990s all these countries had pro-Russian governments which had generally come to power through elections. Close but more tenuous relations exist between Russia and Georgia...
(overwhelmingly Orthodox) and Ukraine (in large part Orthodox); but both of which also have strong senses of national identity and past independence. In the Orthodox Balkans, Russia has close relations with Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Cyprus, and somewhat less close ones with Romania. The Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union remain highly dependent on Russia both economically and in the security area. The Baltic republics, in contrast, responding to the gravitational pull of Europe effectively removed themselves from the Russian sphere of influence.

Overall Russia is creating a bloc with an Orthodox heartland under its leadership and a surrounding buffer of relatively weak Islamic states which it will in varying degrees dominate and from which it will attempt to exclude the influence of other powers. Russia also expects the world to accept and to approve this system. Foreign governments and international organizations, as Yeltsin said in February 1993, need to "grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR." While the Soviet Union was a superpower with global interests, Russia is a major power with regional and civilizational interests.

The Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union are central to the development of a coherent Russian bloc in Eurasian and world affairs. During the breakup of the Soviet Union, all five of these countries initially moved in a highly nationalist direction, emphasizing their new independence and distance from Moscow. Subsequently, recognition of economic, geopolitical, and cultural realities led the voters in four of them to elect pro-Russian governments and to back pro-Russian policies. The people in these countries look to Russia for support and protection. In the fifth, Georgia, Russian military intervention compelled a similar shift in the stance of the government.

Armenia has historically identified its interests with Russia and Russia has prided itself as Armenia’s defender against its Muslim neighbors. This relationship has been reinvigorated in the post-Soviet years. The Armenians have been dependent upon Russian economic and military support and have backed Russia on issues concerning relations among the former Soviet republics. The two countries have converging strategic interests.

Unlike Armenia, Belarus has little sense of national identity. It is also even more dependent on Russian support. Many of its residents seem to identify as much with Russia as with their own country. In January 1994 the legislature replaced the centrist and moderate nationalist who was head of state with a conservative pro-Russian. In July 1994, 80 percent of the voters elected as president an extreme pro-Russian ally of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Belarus early joined the Commonwealth of Independent States, was a charter member of the economic union created in 1993 with Russia and Ukraine, agreed to a monetary union with Russia, surrendered its nuclear weapons to Russia, and agreed to the stationing of Russian troops on its soil for the rest of this century. In 1995 Belarus was, in effect, part of Russia in all but name.
After Moldova became independent with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many looked forward to its eventual reintegration with Romania. The fear that this would happen, in turn, stimulated a secessionist movement in the Russified east, which had the tacit support of Moscow and the active support of the Russian 14th Army and led to the creation of the Trans-Dniester Republic. Moldovan sentiment for union with Romania, however, declined in response to the economic problems of both countries and Russian economic pressure. Moldova joined the CIS and trade with Russia expanded. In February 1994 pro-Russian parties were overwhelmingly successful in the parliamentary elections.

In these three states public opinion responding to some combination of strategic and economic interests produced governments favoring close alignment with Russia. A somewhat similar pattern eventually occurred in Ukraine. In Georgia the course of events was different. Georgia was an independent country until 1801 when its ruler, King George XIII, asked for Russian protection against the Turks. For three years after the Russian Revolution, 1918–1921, Georgia was again independent, but the Bolsheviks forcibly incorporated it into the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union ended, Georgia once again declared independence. A nationalist coalition won the elections, but its leader engaged in self-destructive repression and was violently overthrown. Eduard A. Shevardnadze, who had been foreign minister of the Soviet Union, returned to lead the country and was confirmed in power by presidential elections in 1992 and 1995. He was, however, confronted by a separatist movement in Abkhazia, which became the recipient of substantial Russian support, and also by an insurrection led by the ousted Gamsakhurdia. Emulating King George, he concluded that “We do not have a great choice,” and turned to Moscow for help. Russian troops intervened to support him at the price of Georgia joining the CIS. In 1994 the Georgians agreed to let the Russians keep three military bases in Georgia for an indefinite period of time. Russian military intervention first to weaken the Georgian government and then to sustain it thus brought independence-minded Georgia into the Russian camp.

Apart from Russia the most populous and most important former Soviet republic is Ukraine. At various times in history Ukraine has been independent. Yet during most of the modern era it has been part of a political entity governed from Moscow. The decisive event occurred in 1654 when Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Cossack leader of an uprising against Polish rule, agreed to swear allegiance to the tsar in return for help against the Poles. From then until 1991, except for a briefly independent republic between 1917 and 1920, what is now Ukraine was controlled politically from Moscow. Ukraine, however, is a cleft country with two distinct cultures. The civilizational fault line between the West and Orthodoxy runs through its heart and has done so for centuries. At times in the past, western Ukraine was part of Poland, Lithuania, and the Austro-Hungarian empire. A large portion of its population have been adherents of the Uniate Church which practices Orthodox rites but acknowledges
the authority of the Pope. Historically, western Ukrainians have spoken Ukrainian and have been strongly nationalist in their outlook. The people of eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, have been overwhelmingly Orthodox and have in large part spoken Russian. In the early 1990s Russians made up 22 percent and native Russian speakers 31 percent of the total Ukrainian population. A majority of the elementary and secondary school students were taught in Russian. The Crimea is overwhelmingly Russian and was part of the Russian Federation until 1954, when Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine ostensibly in recognition of Khmelnytsky’s decision 300 years earlier.

The differences between eastern and western Ukraine are manifest in the attitudes of their peoples. In late 1992, for instance, one-third of the Russians in western Ukraine as compared with only 10 percent in Kiev said they suffered from anti-Russian animosity. The east-west split was dramatically evident in the July 1994 presidential elections. The incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, who despite working closely with Russia’s leaders identified himself as a nationalist, carried the thirteen provinces of the western Ukraine with majorities ranging up to over 90 percent. His opponent, Leonid Kuchma, who took Ukrainian speech lessons during the campaign, carried the thirteen eastern provinces by comparable majorities. Kuchma won with 52 percent of the vote. In effect, a slim majority of the Ukrainian public in 1994 confirmed Khmelnytsky’s choice in 1654. The election, as one American expert observed, “reflected, even crystallized, the split between Europeanized Slavs in western Ukraine and the Russo-Slav vision of what Ukraine should be. It’s not ethnic polarization so much as different cultures.”

Ukraine: A Cleft Country
As a result of this division, the relations between Ukraine and Russia could develop in one of three ways. In the early 1990s, critically important issues existed between the two countries concerning nuclear weapons, Crimea, the rights of Russians in Ukraine, the Black Sea fleet, and economic relations. Many people thought armed conflict was likely, which led some Western analysts to argue that the West should support Ukraine’s having a nuclear arsenal to deter Russian aggression.\textsuperscript{9} If civilization is what counts, however, violence between Ukrainians and Russians is unlikely. These are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships for centuries and between whom intermarriage is common. Despite highly contentious issues and the pressure of extreme nationalists on both sides, the leaders of both countries worked hard and largely successfully to moderate these disputes. The election of an explicitly Russian-oriented president in Ukraine in mid-1994 further reduced the probability of exacerbated conflict between the two countries. While serious fighting occurred between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Russians and Baltic peoples, as of 1995 virtually no violence had occurred between Russians and Ukrainians.

A second and somewhat more likely possibility is that Ukraine could split along its fault line into two separate entities, the eastern of which would merge with Russia. The issue of secession first came up with respect to Crimea. The Crimean public, which is 70 percent Russian, substantially supported Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum in December 1991. In May 1992 the Crimean parliament also voted to declare independence from Ukraine and then, under Ukrainian pressure, rescinded that vote. The Russian parliament, however, voted to cancel the 1954 cession of Crimea to Ukraine. In January 1994 Crimeans elected a president who had campaigned on a platform of “unity with Russia.” This stimulated some people to raise the question: “Will Crimea Be the Next Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia?”\textsuperscript{10} The answer was a resounding “No!” as the new Crimean president backed away from his commitment to hold a referendum on independence and instead negotiated with the Kiev government. In May 1994 the situation heated up again when the Crimean parliament voted to restore the 1992 constitution which made it virtually independent of Ukraine. Once again, however, the restraint of Russian and Ukrainian leaders prevented this issue from generating violence, and the election two months later of the pro-Russian Kuchma as Ukrainian president undermined the Crimean thrust for secession.

That election did, however, raise the possibility of the western part of the country seceding from a Ukraine that was drawing closer and closer to Russia. Some Russians might welcome this. As one Russian general put it, “Ukraine or rather Eastern Ukraine will come back in five, ten or fifteen years. Western Ukraine can go to hell!”\textsuperscript{11} Such a rump Uniate and Western-oriented Ukraine, however, would only be viable if it had strong and effective Western support. Such support is, in turn, likely to be forthcoming only if relations between
the West and Russia deteriorated seriously and came to resemble those of the Cold War.

The third and more likely scenario is that Ukraine will remain united, remain cleft, remain independent, and generally cooperate closely with Russia. Once the transition questions concerning nuclear weapons and military forces are resolved, the most serious longer term issues will be economic, the resolution of which will be facilitated by a partially shared culture and close personalities. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship is to eastern Europe, John Morrison has pointed out, what the Franco-German relationship is to western Europe. Just as the latter provides the core of the European Union, the former is the core essential to unity in the Orthodox world.

Greater China and Its CoProsperity Sphere

China historically conceived itself as encompassing: a “Sinic Zone” including Korea, Vietnam, the Liu Chiu Islands, and at times Japan; an “Inner Asian Zone” of non-Chinese Manchus, Mongols, Uighurs, Turks, and Tibetans, who had to be controlled for security reasons; and then an “Outer Zone” of barbarians, who were nonetheless “expected to pay tribute and acknowledge China’s superiority.”15 Contemporary Sinic civilization is becoming structured in a similar fashion: the central core of Han China, outlying provinces that are part of China but possess considerable autonomy, provinces legally part of China but heavily populated by non-Chinese people from other civilizations (Tibet, Xinjiang), Chinese societies which will or are likely to become part of Beijing-centered China on defined conditions (Hong Kong, Taiwan), one predominantly Chinese state increasingly oriented toward Beijing (Singapore), highly influential Chinese populations in Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and non-Chinese societies (North and South Korea, Vietnam) which nonetheless share much of China’s Confucian culture.

During the 1950s China defined itself as an ally of the Soviet Union. Then, after the Sino-Soviet split, it saw itself as the leader of the Third World against both the superpowers, which produced substantial costs and few benefits. After the shift in U.S. policy in the Nixon administration, China sought to be the third party in a balance of power game with the two superpowers, aligning itself with the United States during the 1970s when the United States seemed weak and then shifting to a more equidistant position in the 1980s as U.S. military power increased and the Soviet Union declined economically and became bogged down in Afghanistan. With the end of the superpower competition, however, the “China card” lost all value, and China was compelled once more to redefine its role in world affairs. It set two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture, the core state civilizational magnet toward which all other Chinese communities would orient themselves, and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.
These emerging roles of China are seen in: first, the way in which China describes its position in world affairs; second, the extent to which overseas Chinese have become involved economically in China; and third, the increasing economic, political, and diplomatic connections with China of the three other principal Chinese entities, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, as well as the enhanced orientation toward China of the Southeast Asian countries where Chinese have significant political influence.

The Chinese government sees mainland China as the core state of a Chinese civilization toward which all other Chinese communities should orient themselves. Having long since abandoned its efforts to promote its interests abroad through local communist parties, the government has sought “to position itself as the worldwide representative of Chineseness.” To the Chinese government, people of Chinese descent, even if citizens of another country, are members of the Chinese community and hence in some measure subject to the authority of the Chinese government. Chinese identity comes to be defined in racial terms. Chinese are those of the same “race, blood, and culture,” as one PRC scholar put it. In the mid-1990s, this theme was increasingly heard from governmental and private Chinese sources. For Chinese and those of Chinese descent living in non-Chinese societies, the “mirror test” thus becomes the test of who they are: “Go look in the mirror,” is the admonition of Beijing-oriented Chinese to those of Chinese descent trying to assimilate into foreign societies. Chinese of the diaspora, that is, huaren or people of Chinese origin, as distinguished from zhongguoren or people of the Chinese state, have increasingly articulated the concept of “cultural China” as a manifestation of their gosshi or common awareness. Chinese identity, subject to so many onslaughts from the West in the twentieth century, is now being reformulated in terms of the continuing elements of Chinese culture.

Historically this identity has also been compatible with varying relationships to the central authorities of the Chinese state. This sense of cultural identity both facilitates and is reinforced by the expansion of the economic relationships among the several Chinas, which, in turn, have been a major element promoting rapid economic growth in mainland China and elsewhere, which, in turn, has provided the material and psychological impetus to enhance Chinese cultural identity.

“Greater China” is thus not simply an abstract concept. It is a rapidly growing cultural and economic reality and has begun to become a political one. Chinese were responsible for the dramatic economic development in the 1980s and 1990s on the mainland, in the Tigers (three out of four of which are Chinese), and in Southeast Asia. The economy of East Asia is increasingly China-centered and Chinese-dominated. Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore have supplied much of the capital responsible for the growth of the mainland in the 1990s. Overseas Chinese elsewhere in Southeast Asia dominated the economies of their countries. In the early 1990s, Chinese made up 1 percent of the population of the Philippines but were responsible for 35
percent of the sales of domestically owned firms. In Indonesia in the mid 1980s, Chinese were 2–3 percent of the population, but owned roughly 70 percent of the private domestic capital. Seventeen of the twenty-five largest businesses were Chinese-controlled, and one Chinese conglomerate reportedly accounted for 5 percent of Indonesia’s GNP. In the early 1990s Chinese were 10 percent of the population of Thailand but owned nine of the ten largest business groups and were responsible for 50 percent of its GNP. Chinese are about one-third of the population of Malaysia but almost totally dominate the economy. Outside Japan and Korea the East Asian economy is basically a Chinese economy.

The emergence of the greater China co-prosperity sphere was greatly facilitated by a “bamboo network” of family and personal relationships and a common culture. Overseas Chinese are much more able than either Westerners or Japanese to do business in China. In China trust and commitment depend on personal contacts, not contracts or laws and other legal documents. Western businessmen find it easier to do business in India than in China where the sanctity of an agreement rests on the personal relationship between the parties. China, a leading Japanese observed with envy in 1993, benefited from “a borderless network of Chinese merchants in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia.” The overseas Chinese, an American businessman agreed, “have the entrepreneurial skills, they have the language, and they combine the bamboo network from family relations to contacts. That’s an enormous advantage over someone who must report back to a board in Akron or Philadelphia.” The advantages of nonmainland Chinese dealing with the mainland were also well stated by Lee Kuan Yew: “We are ethnic Chinese. We share certain characteristics through common ancestry and culture. . . . People feel a natural empathy for those who share their physical attributes. This sense of closeness is reinforced when they also share a basis for culture and language. It makes for easy rapport and trust, which is the foundation for all business relations.” In the late 1980s and 1990s, overseas ethnic Chinese were able “to demonstrate to a skeptical world that quanxi connections through the same language and culture can make up for a lack in the rule of law and transparency in rules and regulations.” The roots of economic development in a common culture were highlighted in the Second World Chinese Entrepreneurs Conference in Hong Kong in November 1993, described as “a celebration of Chinese triumphalism attended by ethnic Chinese businessmen from around the world.” In the Sinic world as elsewhere cultural commonality promotes economic engagement.

The reduction in Western economic involvement in China after Tiananmen Square, following a decade of rapid Chinese economic growth, created the opportunity and incentive for overseas Chinese to capitalize on their common culture and personal contacts and to invest heavily in China. The result was a dramatic expansion of overall economic ties among the Chinese communities. In 1992, 80 percent of the foreign direct investment in China ($11.3 billion)
came from overseas Chinese, primarily in Hong Kong (68.3 percent), but also in Taiwan (9.3 percent), Singapore, Macao, and elsewhere. In contrast, Japan provided 6.6 percent and the United States 4.6 percent of the total. Of total accumulated foreign investment of $50 billion, 67 percent was from Chinese sources. Trade growth was equally impressive. Taiwan’s exports to China rose from almost nothing in 1986 to 8 percent of Taiwan’s total exports in 1992, expanding that year at a rate of 35 percent. Singapore’s exports to China increased 22 percent in 1992 compared with overall growth in its exports of less than 2 percent. As Murray Weidenbaum observed in 1993, “Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce, and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing, and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources, and labor (mainland China).” 20 In addition, of course, mainland China was the potentially biggest of all expanding markets, and by the mid-1990s investments in China were increasingly oriented to sales in that market as well as to exports from it.

Chinese in Southeast Asian countries assimilate in varying degrees with the local population, the latter often harboring anti-Chinese sentiments which, on occasion, as in the Medan riot in Indonesia in April 1994, erupt into violence. Some Malaysians and Indonesians criticized as “capital flight” the flow of Chinese investment to the mainland, and political leaders led by President Suharto had to reassure their publics that this would not damage their economies. Southeast Asian Chinese, in turn, insisted that their loyalties were strictly to their country of birth not that of their ancestors. In the early 1990s the outflow of Chinese capital from Southeast Asia to China was countered by the heavy flow of Taiwanese investment to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

The combination of growing economic power and shared Chinese culture led Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore increasingly to involve themselves with the Chinese homeland. Accommodating themselves to the approaching transfer of power, Hong Kong Chinese began to adapt to rule from Beijing rather than London. Businessmen and other leaders became reluctant to criticize China or to do things that might offend China. When they did offend, the Chinese government did not hesitate to retaliate promptly. By 1994 hundreds of businessmen were cooperating with Beijing and serving as “Hong Kong Advisors” in what was in effect a shadow government. In the early 1990s Chinese economic influence in Hong Kong also expanded dramatically, with investment from the mainland by 1993 reportedly more than that from Japan and the United States combined. 21 By the mid-1990s the economic integration of Hong Kong and mainland China has become virtually complete, with political integration to be consummated in 1997.

Expansion of Taiwan’s ties with the mainland lagged behind Hong Kong’s.
Significant changes, nonetheless, began to occur in the 1980s. For three decades after 1949, the two Chinese republics refused to recognize each other’s existence or legitimacy, had no communication with each other, and were in a virtual state of war, manifested from time to time in the exchange of gunfire at the offshore islands. After Deng Xiaoping consolidated his power and began the process of economic reform, however, the mainland government initiated a series of conciliatory moves. In 1981 the Taiwan government responded and started to shift away from its previous “three no’s” policy of no contact, no negotiation, no compromise with the mainland. In May 1986 the first negotiations occurred between representatives of the two sides over the return of a Republic of China plane that had been hijacked to the mainland, and the following year the ROC dropped its ban on travel to the mainland.\textsuperscript{22}

The rapid expansion of economic relations between Taiwan and the mainland that followed was greatly facilitated by their “shared Chineseness” and the mutual trust that resulted from it. The people of Taiwan and China, as Taiwan’s principal negotiator observed, have a “blood-is-thicker-than-water kind of sentiment,” and took pride in each other’s accomplishments. By the end of 1993 there had been over 4.2 million visits of Taiwanese to the mainland and 40,000 visits of mainlanders to Taiwan; 40,000 letters and 13,000 phone calls were exchanged daily. Trade between the two Chinas reportedly reached $14.4 billion in 1993 and 20,000 Taiwan businesses had invested something between $15 billion and $30 billion in the mainland. Taiwan’s attention was increasingly focused on and its success dependent on the mainland. “Before 1980, the most important market to Taiwan was America,” one Taiwan official observed in 1993, “but for the 1990s we know the most critical factor in the success of Taiwan’s economy is the mainland.” The mainland’s cheap labor was a main attraction for Taiwanese investors confronting a labor shortage at home. In 1994 a reverse process of rectifying the capital-labor imbalance between the two Chinas got under way with Taiwan fishing companies hiring 10,000 mainlanders to man their boats.\textsuperscript{23}

Developing economic connections led to negotiations between the two governments. In 1991 Taiwan created the Straits Exchange Foundation, and the mainland the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait, for communication with each other. Their first meeting was held in Singapore in April 1993, with subsequent meetings occurring on the mainland and Taiwan. In August 1994 a “breakthrough” agreement was reached covering a number of key issues, and speculation began concerning a possible summit between top leaders of the two governments.

In the mid-1990s major issues still exist between Taipei and Beijing including the question of sovereignty, Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and the possibility that Taiwan might redefine itself as an independent state. The likelihood of the latter happening, however, became increasingly remote as the principal advocate of independence, the Democratic Progressive
Party, found that Taiwanese voters did not want to disrupt existing relations with the mainland and that its electoral prospects would be hurt by pressing the issue. DPP leaders hence emphasized that if they did win power, independence would not be an immediate item on their agenda. The two governments also shared a common interest in asserting Chinese sovereignty over the Spratly and other islands in the South China Sea and in assuring American most favored nation treatment in trade for the mainland. In the early 1990s, slowly but perceptively and ineluctably, the two Chinas were moving toward each other and developing common interests from their expanding economic relations and shared cultural identity.

This movement toward accommodation was abruptly suspended in 1995 as the Taiwanese government aggressively pushed for diplomatic recognition and admission to international organizations. President Lee Teng-hui made a “private” visit to the United States, and Taiwan held legislative elections in December 1995 followed by presidential elections in March 1996. In response, the Chinese government tested missiles in waters close to the major Taiwanese ports and engaged in military exercises near Taiwanese-controlled offshore islands. These developments raised two key issues. For the present, can Taiwan remain democratic without becoming formally independent? In the future could Taiwan be democratic without remaining actually independent?

In effect the relations of Taiwan to the mainland have gone through two phases and could enter a third. For decades the Nationalist government claimed to be the government of all of China; this claim obviously meant conflict with the government that was in fact the government of all of China except Taiwan. In the 1980s the Taiwanese government dropped this pretension and defined itself as the government of Taiwan, which provided the basis for accommodation with the mainland concept of “one country, two systems.” Various individuals and groups in Taiwan, however, increasingly emphasized Taiwan’s separate cultural identity, its relatively brief period under Chinese rule, and its local language incomprehensible to Mandarin speakers. In effect, they were attempting to define Taiwanese society as non-Chinese and hence legitimately independent of China. In addition, as the Taiwan government became more active internationally, it, too, seemed to be suggesting that it was a separate country not part of China. In short, the Taiwan government’s self-definition appeared to evolve from government of all of China, to government of part of China, toward government of none of China. The latter position, formalizing its de facto independence, would be totally unacceptable to the Beijing government, which repeatedly affirmed its willingness to use force to prevent it from materializing. Chinese government leaders also stated that following incorporation into the PRC of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999, they will move to reassociate Taiwan with the mainland. How this occurs depends, presumably, on the degree to which support for formal independence grows in Taiwan, the resolution of the succession struggle in Beijing which
encourages political and military leaders to be strongly nationalist, and the development of Chinese military capabilities that would make feasible a blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Early in the twenty-first century it seems likely that through coercion, accommodation, or most likely a mixture of both, Taiwan will become more closely integrated with mainland China.

Until the late 1970s relations between staunchly anticommunist Singapore and the People’s Republic were frosty, and Lee Kuan Yew and other Singaporean leaders were contemptuous of Chinese backwardness. As Chinese economic development took off in the 1980s, however, Singapore began to reorient itself toward the mainland in classic bandwagoning fashion. By 1992 Singapore had invested $1.9 billion in China, and the following year plans were announced to build an industrial township, “Singapore II,” outside Shanghai, that would involve billions of dollars of investment. Lee became an enthusiastic booster of China’s economic prospects and an admirer of its power. “China,” he said in 1993, “is where the action is.” Singaporean foreign investment which had been heavily concentrated in Malaysia and Indonesia shifted to China. Half of the overseas projects helped by the Singaporean government in 1993 were in China. On his first visit to Beijing in the 1970s, Lee Kuan Yew reportedly insisted on speaking to Chinese leaders in English rather than Mandarin. It is unlikely he did that two decades later.

**Islam: Consciousness Without Cohesion**

The structure of political loyalty among Arabs and among Muslims generally has been the opposite of that in the modern West. For the latter the nation state has been the apex of political loyalty. Narrower loyalties are subordinate to it and are subsumed into loyalty to the nation state. Groups transcending nation states—linguistic or religious communities, or civilizations—have commanded less intense loyalty and commitment. Along a continuum of narrower to broader entities, Western loyalties thus tend to peak in the middle, the loyalty intensity curve forming in some measure an inverse U. In the Islamic world, the structure of loyalty has been almost exactly the reverse. Islam has had a hollow middle in its hierarchy of loyalties. The “two fundamental, original, and persisting structures,” as Ira Lapidus has observed, have been the family, the clan, and the tribe, on the one hand, and the “unities of culture, religion, and empire on an ever-larger scale,” on the other. “Tribalism and Religion (Islam) played and still plays,” one Libyan scholar similarly observed, “a significant and determining role in the social, economic, cultural, and political developments of Arab Societies and Political Systems. Indeed, they are intertwined in such a way that they are considered the most important factors and variables which shape and determine Arab Political culture and [the] Arab Political Mind.” Tribes have been central to politics in Arab states, many of which, as Tahsin Bashir put it, are simply “tribes with flags.” The founder of
Saudi Arabia succeeded in large part as a result of his skill in creating a tribal coalition through marriage and other means, and Saudi politics has continued to be a largely tribal politics pitting Sudairis against Shammars and other tribes. At least eighteen major tribes have played significant roles in Libyan development, and some five hundred tribes are said to live in the Sudan, the largest of which encompasses 12 percent of the country’s population.26

In Central Asia historically, national identities did not exist. “The loyalty was to the tribe, clan, and extended family, not to the state.” At the other extreme, people did have “language, religion, culture, and life styles” in common, and “Islam was the strongest unifying force among people, more so than the emir’s power.” Some one hundred “mountainous” and seventy “plains” clans have existed among the Chechens and related North Caucasus peoples and controlled politics and the economy to such an extent that, in contrast to the Soviet planned economy, the Chechens were alleged to have a “clanned” economy.27

Throughout Islam the small group and the great faith, the tribe and the ummah, have been the principal foci of loyalty and commitment, and the nation state has been less significant. In the Arab world, existing states have legitimacy problems because they are for the most part the arbitrary, if not capricious, products of European imperialism, and their boundaries often did not even coincide with those of ethnic groups such as Berbers and Kurds. These states divided the Arab nation, but a Pan-Arab state, on the other hand, has never materialized. In addition, the idea of sovereign nation states is incompatible with belief in the sovereignty of Allah and the primacy of the ummah. As a revolutionary movement, Islamist fundamentalism rejects the nation state in favor of the unity of Islam just as Marxism rejected it in favor of the unity of the international proletariat. The weakness of the nation state in Islam is also reflected in the fact that while numerous conflicts occurred between Muslim groups during the years after World War II, major wars between Muslim states were rare, the most significant ones involving Iraq invading its neighbors.

In the 1970s and 1980s the same factors which gave rise to the Islamic Resurgence within countries also strengthened identification with the ummah or Islamic civilization as a whole. As one scholar observed in the mid-1980s:

A profound concern with Muslim identity and unity has been further stimulated by decolonization, demographic growth, industrialization, urbanization, and a changing international economic order associated with, among other things, the oil wealth beneath Muslim lands. . . . Modern communications have strengthened and elaborated the ties among Muslim peoples. There has been a steep growth in the numbers who make the pilgrimage to Mecca, creating a more intense sense of common identity among Muslims from as far afield as China and Senegal, Yemen and Bangladesh. Growing numbers of students from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines, and Africa are studying in Middle Eastern universities, spreading ideas and establish-
ing personal contacts across national boundaries. There are regular and increasingly frequent conferences and consultations among Muslim intellectuals and ulama (religious scholars) held in such centers as Teheran, Mecca, and Kuala Lumpur. . . . Cassettes (sound, and now video) disseminate mosque sermons across international boundaries, so that influential preachers now reach audiences far beyond their local communities. 28

The sense of Muslim unity has also been reflected in and encouraged by the actions of states and international organizations. In 1969 the leaders of Saudi Arabia, working with those of Pakistan, Morocco, Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey, organized the first Islamic summit at Rabat. Out of this emerged the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which was formally established with a headquarters in Jiddah in 1972. Virtually all states with substantial Muslim populations now belong to the Conference, which is the only interstate organization of its kind. Christian, Orthodox, Buddhist, Hindu governments do not have interstate organizations with memberships based on religion; Muslim governments do. In addition, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and Libya have sponsored and supported nongovernmental organizations such as the World Muslim Congress (a Pakistani creation) and the Muslim World League (a Saudi creation), as well as “numerous, often very distant, regimes, parties, movements, and causes that are believed to share their ideological orientations” and which are “enriching the flow of information and resources among Muslims.” 29

Movement from Islamic consciousness to Islamic cohesion, however, involves two paradoxes. First, Islam is divided among competing power centers each attempting to capitalize on Muslim identification with the ummah in order to promote Islamic cohesion under its leadership. This competition goes on between the established regimes and their organizations, on the one hand, and Islamist regimes and their organizations, on the other. Saudi Arabia took the lead in creating the OIC in part to have a counter to the Arab League, which at the time was dominated by Nasser. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the Sudanese leader Hassan al-Turabi created the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) as a counter to the Saudi dominated OIC. PAIC’s third conference, in Khartoum in early 1995, was attended by several hundred delegates from Islamist organizations and movements in eighty countries. 30 In addition to these formal organizations, the Afghanistan war generated an extensive network of informal and underground groups of veterans who have shown up fighting for Muslim or Islamist causes in Algeria, Chechnya, Egypt, Tunisia, Bosnia, Palestine, the Philippines, and elsewhere. After the war their ranks were renewed with fighters trained at the University of Dawa and Jihad outside Peshawar and in camps sponsored by various factions and their foreign backers in Afghanistan. The common interests shared by radical regimes and movements have on occasion overcome more traditional antagonisms, and with
Core States, Concentric Circles, and Civilizational Order

Iranian support linkages were created between Sunni and Shi’ite fundamentalist groups. Close military cooperation exists between Sudan and Iran, the Iranian air force and navy used Sudanese facilities, and the two governments cooperated in supporting fundamentalist groups in Algeria and elsewhere. Hassan al-Turabi and Saddam Hussein allegedly developed close ties in 1994, and Iran and Iraq moved toward reconciliation.31

Second, the concept of ummah presupposes the illegitimacy of the nation state and yet the ummah can be unified only through the actions of one or more strong core states which are currently lacking. The concept of Islam as a unified religious-political community has meant that core states have usually materialized in the past only when religious and political leadership—the caliphate and the sultanate—have been combined in a single ruling institution. The rapid seventh-century Arab conquest of North Africa and the Middle East culminated in the Umayyad caliphate with its capital in Damascus. This was followed in the eighth century by the Baghdad-based, Persian-influenced, Abbasid caliphate, with secondary caliphates emerging in Cairo and Cordoba in the tenth century. Four hundred years later the Ottoman Turks swept across the Middle East, capturing Constantinople in 1453 and establishing a new caliphate in 1517. About the same time other Turkic peoples invaded India and founded the Mogul empire. The rise of the West undermined both the Ottoman and Mogul empires, and the end of the Ottoman empire left Islam without a core state. Its territories were, in considerable measure, divided among Western powers, which when they retreated left behind fragile states formed on a Western model alien to the traditions of Islam. Hence for most of the twentieth century no Muslim country has had both sufficient power and sufficient cultural and religious legitimacy to assume that role and be accepted as the leader of Islam by other Islamic states and non-Islamic countries.

The absence of an Islamic core state is a major contributor to the pervasive internal and external conflicts which characterize Islam. Consciousness without cohesion is a source of weakness to Islam and a source of threat to other civilizations. Is this condition likely to be sustained?

An Islamic core state has to possess the economic resources, military power, organizational competence, and Islamic identity and commitment to provide both political and religious leadership to the ummah. Six states are from time to time mentioned as possible leaders of Islam; at present, no one of them, however, has all the requisites to be an effective core state. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country and is growing rapidly economically, It is, however, located on the periphery of Islam far removed from its Arab center; its Islam is of the relaxed, Southeast Asian variety; and its people and culture are a mixture of indigenous, Muslim, Hindu, Chinese, and Christian influences. Egypt is an Arab country, with a large population, a central, strategically important geographical location in the Middle East, and the leading institution of Islamic learning, Al-Azhar University. It is also, however, a poor country, economically
dependent on the United States, Western-controlled international institutions, and oil-rich Arab states.

Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have all explicitly defined themselves as Muslim countries and have actively attempted to exercise influence in and provide leadership to the ummah. In so doing, they have competed with each other in sponsoring organizations, funding Islamic groups, providing support to the fighters in Afghanistan, and wooing the Muslim peoples of Central Asia. Iran has the size, central location, population, historical traditions, oil resources, and middle level of economic development which would qualify it to be an Islamic core state. Ninety percent of Muslims, however, are Sunni and Iran is Shi’ite; Persian is a distant second to Arabic as the language of Islam; and the relations between Persians and Arabs have historically been antagonistic.

Pakistan has size, population, and military prowess, and its leaders have fairly consistently tried to claim a role as the promoter of cooperation among Islamic states and the speaker for Islam to the rest of the world. Pakistan is, however, relatively poor and suffers serious internal ethnic and regional divisions, a record of political instability, and a fixation on the problem of its security vis-à-vis India, which accounts in large part for its interest in developing close relations with other Islamic countries, as well as non-Muslim powers like China and the United States.

Saudi Arabia was the original home of Islam; Islam’s holiest shrines are there; its language is Islam’s language; it has the world’s largest oil reserves and the resulting financial influence; and its government has shaped Saudi society along strictly Islamic lines. During the 1970s and 1980s Saudi Arabia was the single most influential force in Islam. It spent billions of dollars supporting Muslim causes throughout the world, from mosques and textbooks to political parties, Islamist organizations, and terrorist movements, and was relatively indiscriminate in doing so. On the other hand, its relatively small population and geographical vulnerability make it dependent on the West for its security.

Finally, Turkey has the history, population, middle level of economic development, national coherence, and military tradition and competence to be the core state of Islam. In explicitly defining Turkey as a secular society, however, Atatürk prevented the Turkish republic from succeeding the Ottoman empire in that role. Turkey could not even become a charter member of the OIC because of the commitment to secularism in its constitution. So long as Turkey continues to define itself as a secular state, leadership of Islam is denied it.

What, however, if Turkey redefined itself? At some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West and to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic interlocutor and antagonist of the West. Fundamentalism has been on the rise in Turkey; under Özal Turkey made extensive efforts to identify itself with the Arab world; it has capitalized on ethnic and linguistic ties to play a modest role in Central Asia; it has provided
encouragement and support to the Bosnian Muslims. Among Muslim countries Turkey is unique in having extensive historical connections with Muslims in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Conceivably, Turkey, in effect, could “do a South Africa”: abandoning secularism as alien to its being as South Africa abandoned apartheid and thereby changing itself from a pariah state in its civilization to the leading state of that civilization. Having experienced the good and the bad of the West in Christianity and apartheid, South Africa is peculiarly qualified to lead Africa. Having experienced the bad and the good of the West in secularism and democracy, Turkey may be equally qualified to lead Islam. But to do so it would have to reject Ataturk’s legacy more thoroughly than Russia has rejected Lenin’s. It would also take a leader of Ataturk’s caliber and one who combined religious and political legitimacy to remake Turkey from a torn country into a core state.